

# CLIMATE FINANCE AND GENDER:

LESSONS FROM NORDIC EFFORTS TO  
INTEGRATE GENDER EQUALITY IN CLIMATE-  
RELATED DEVELOPMENT FINANCE



This report provides an update to a study that was presented at COP26 in Glasgow in 2021<sup>1</sup>. The study has been commissioned by DanChurchAid, Felm, Finn Church Aid, Act Church of Sweden, and Norwegian Church Aid. The first version of this study was conducted by the Danish firm INKA Consult and carried out by consultants Christopher Roy and Sunitha Bisan in collaboration with Verena Nitschke and Lisa Reenberg of DanChurchAid. The update of this study was conducted **pro-bono** by INKA Consult and carried out by consultants Tallulah Cherry-Virdee, Rasmus Bo Sørensen and Hans Peter Dejgaard in collaboration with Signe Skovgaard Madsen, Barbora Koleckova and Cecilie Conrad of DanChurchAid.

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<sup>1</sup> [From Words to Action - Lessons From Nordic Efforts to Integrate Gender Equality in Climate Finance](#)

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## List of abbreviations

BR	Biennial Report to the UNFCCC
BPfA	Beijing Platform for Action
CBDR-RC	Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
Act CoS	Act Church of Sweden
COP	Conference of Parties
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease
CTF	Common Tabular Format
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DCA	DanChurchAid
DED	Development Engagement Document
DKK	Danish Kroner
EUR	Euro
FCA	Finn Church Aid
GAP	Gender Action Plan
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GEM	Gender Equality Marker
GGGI	Global Green Growth Institute
GR	Governance Regulation (Replacing EU MMR)
GRB	Gender Responsive Budgeting
IFC	International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group)
IFU	Denmark's Investment Fund for Developing Countries
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LMIC	Low- and Middle-Income Countries
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MMR	Monitoring Mechanism Regulation (EU)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NGO	Non-government organisation
NICFI	Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OOF	Other Official Flows
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
RM	Rio Marker
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNCBD	United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
UNCCD	United Nations Convention on Combatting Desertification
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UMIC	Upper- and Middle-Income Countries
USD	United States Dollar

## List of definitions

This report takes the following definitions:

**Gender equality** refers to the full and equal exercise of rights by men and women: they have equal access to socially, economically, and politically valued goods, resources, opportunities, benefits, and services.

**Social inclusion** refers to the process of removing institutional barriers and the improvement of incentives to increase the access to development opportunities by a range of individuals and groups; it is essentially making the ‘rules of the game’ fairer (Prosperity Fund, 2018).

**Gender stereotype** is a generalised view or preconception about attributes or characteristics, or the roles that are or ought to be possessed by or performed by women and men. A gender stereotype is harmful when it limits women’s and men’s capacity to develop their personal abilities, pursue their professional careers and make choices about their lives (OHCHR, 2021)

**Gender stereotyping** refers to the practice of ascribing to an individual woman or man specific attributes, characteristics, or roles by reason only of her or his membership in the social group of women or men. Gender stereotyping is wrongful when it results in a violation or violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms (OHCHR, 2021).

**Intersectionality** refers to the way in which multiple forms of discrimination – based on gender, race, sexuality, disability, and class, etc. – overlap and interact with one another to shape how different individuals and groups experience discrimination (Taylor, 2019).

**Gender equality integration** is a term defined in Sweden’s fourth Biennial Report to the UNFCCC specific to the context of climate finance. Financial commitments that are marked with a gender equality policy marker of either principal or significant are considered gender integrated (Swedish Ministry of the Environment, 2019).

**Gender mainstreaming** - an organisational strategy to bring a gender perspective to all aspects of an institution’s policy and activities, through building gender capacity and accountability. Mainstreaming requires both political as well as technical skills as it seeks to transform the development agenda through prioritising gender concerns into all policies and programmes (Reeves & Baden, 2000).

# Executive Summary

## Chapter 1: Introduction

The Nordic countries have maintained a strong focus on gender equality for many years and are often perceived as leading nations globally in protecting women's rights (World Economic Forum, 2023). Gender has been mainstreamed into much of the Nordics' foreign policy, including, to a certain extent, their development policy and cooperation.

The purpose of the study is to assess the level and quality of gender integration the climate-related development finance provided by Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden in the period 2012-2021 and develop recommendations about gender mainstreaming in climate finance. This study, undertaken by INKA Consult as probono, has been commissioned by DanChurchAid, Felm, FinnChurchAid, Act Church of Sweden, and Norwegian Church Aid.

## Chapter 2: Climate finance and gender equality

Climate change impacts different genders and ages differently across the world, particularly in least developed countries which have high climate exposure and vulnerability, combined with the lowest adaptive capacities (IPCC, 2014; Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative, 2017).

Unequal gender power structures often play a central role in low-income countries and are a major factor in deciding an individual's vulnerability to climate impacts (UNDP & Global Gender and Climate Alliance, 2017). Due to embedded gender roles, women are often the primary providers of food, water, fuel, and care for their families (CARE International, 2020). These gender stereotypes coupled with unequal participation in decision-making and labour markets compound inequalities and prevent women and other demographics from contributing to effective climate action (Klugman et al., 2014; Woetzel et al., 2015). From an emissions contribution standpoint, women have far lower responsibility for the emissions of greenhouse gases than men to date due to historic socio-economic structures and perpetuation of such structures. Multiple layers of social biases and power structures perpetuate unequal access to resources, subordination of marginalised communities and bear witness that any action to achieve climate justice is also an issue of gender justice.

Action to correct gender inequality (as seen in SDG 5) in the face of climate risks is paramount to achieving effective climate action (SDG 13) that "*leaves no one behind*" (Aguilar, 2007). In the context of climate finance, this means conducting activities that are gender sensitive or gender transformative (UNFPA, 2020). If gender is not ingrained in climate finance, there is a risk that inequalities will be augmented and the vulnerabilities of susceptible people and communities realised (Alston, 2013). The case for gender mainstreaming in climate finance is succinctly put by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): "*The inequitable distribution of rights, resources, power, and norms constrains many people's ability to take action on climate change. This is especially true for women and vulnerable groups*" (UNFCCC, 2015b, p. 7).

The UNFCCC seeks to address these issues through its enhanced Gender Action Plan (GAP). The decision to adopt the GAP noted the important role climate finance has in correcting inequalities, and the need for it to be gender-responsive (UNFCCC, 2019a). While there is some level of tracking for the finance reported by donor nations to the OECD, there is no mechanism under the UNFCCC to monitor or report on the gender-responsiveness of climate finance. In understanding the different levels of governance fragmentation, this study seeks to root the inquiry by looking at the Nordic countries that have a substantial political commitment to protect women's rights and gender equality globally, and to understand how gender is being mainstreamed in Nordic climate finance approaches.

### Chapter 3: Gender equality policy architecture for climate finance

Chapter 3 assesses the pathways for gender mainstreaming through the gender and climate policy architecture present in each of the Nordic nations. It is clear across the development policies, strategies and frameworks of the four Nordic countries that they regard gender equality as a fundamental value. However, review of strategic documents and country-level policies covering the areas of climate, gender equality and development policy finds a lack of consistency in the application of gender in climate-related activities. This inconsistency is also reflected in the projects assessed under OECD DAC Gender Equality Markers (see Chapter 5).

Generally, the climate and development policies assessed fail to reflect a gender transformative approach that addresses the root causes of systemic gender biases and unequal power relations. Gender is frequently mentioned across policy documents without clarifying details or committing to specific gender-related goals or initiatives within climate action. Several examples are seen to make only limited reference to gender inequalities, applying focus to building assets and capacities of targeted beneficiaries related to climate change without addressing the systemic disadvantages or power dynamics faced by those targeted beneficiaries.

A further general observation amongst all the assessed policies is that the language and narratives are gender sensitive at the basic level or minimum compliance levels where practical gender needs and stereotypes of women and men are mentioned. None of the policies strongly embrace an intersectional approach to avoid gender binaries or improve gender inclusion. The research finds that “gender” is regularly used as a buzzword, linked to women only and failing to take the step of questioning gendered norms or stereotypical understandings of femininity and masculinity.

It is imperative to understand that data and narratives often tend to mask unequal power relations. The absence of questioning existing norms or presentations of women reproduces institutional culture and perpetuates gender biases, instead of bringing forward transformative change (Dankelman & Jansen, 2010; Magnusdottir & Kronsell, 2015). The emancipation of women to enable their full political and economic participation, as is brought forth in a few strategies, is a relevant tool but this will have to support women as agents of change and not simply as vulnerable beneficiaries or resources.

There is a focus on gender and climate as (separate) cross-cutting issues in many of the relevant Nordic policies. While the two issues are focus areas for the Nordic countries, it remains difficult to find meaningful examples of the integration of gender in climate change policies as well as climate perspectives in gender policies. Although the intention of having gender and climate as cross-cutting commitments shows a basic understanding of the inter-linkages around these issues, if it is not made clear how the nexus will be addressed there is the risk of neglecting their mutual relevance and treating gender instead as a box to tick in project administration. The risk of responding to gender and climate as two cross-cutting issues is demonstrated by the underlying assumption that having committed to gender mainstreaming will lead to gender sensitive climate initiatives by default. To ‘cross-mainstream’ gender and climate remains a challenge and integrating both in all policy areas, including the specific integration of gender in climate policies, is of high importance.

Additionally, it is found that the reliance on the government of the day to ensure the space for advancing gender mainstreaming is not optimal. As an example, for a long time and especially since announcing the world’s first feminist foreign policy in 2014, Sweden has been a pioneer and at the forefront of gender mainstreaming and gender approaches globally. As of 2023, Sweden remains a forerunner in gender equality approaches, but the shift in government has already showed a regression in ambition on gender equality.



## Chapter 4: Climate finance committed by the Nordic countries


This chapter provides an overview of the climate-related development finance commitments of the Nordic countries in the period 2012-2021 as reported to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as well as the climate finance commitments reported to the European Commission for 2021 and 2022. The Nordic countries' climate finance commitments as reported to the OECD are also contextualised in light of their respective populations and in relation to allocations of climate finance as a percentage of each country's GNI, for the year 2021. These two proxy indicators - economy and population size - provide indication of effort according to respective capabilities. The agreed UN target for ODA states that developed countries should devote 0.7% of GNI to ODA, however, there is no agreed GNI target for climate finance allocations for each donor country.

The amount of climate-related development finance committed over the period 2012-2021 varies over the years due to changes in budget allocations and political priorities. In absolute terms, Norway reported the highest total amount of grants and concessional loans to the OECD-DAC CRS over the 10-year period with commitments totalling 7326 million USD, followed by Sweden who reported a total of 7045 million USD. Finland reported the lowest at 1450 million USD. The total amount of grants and concessional loans reported by Denmark in the period is 2859 million USD.

There is a large difference in the per capita commitments of climate finance by the Nordic countries. Sweden commits a high absolute value of climate finance but given its large population it has a relatively low climate finance commitment per capita. Norway has the largest climate finance per capita, while Finland has both the lowest absolute commitment in 2021 and the lowest per capita commitment.

Norway and Sweden surpass considerably the commitment to provide 0.7 percent of their GNI as ODA, so their climate finance can be considered 'new and additional' to development support. However, Denmark surpasses the commitment only slightly, and thus almost none of the reported climate finance can be considered 'new and additional' to ODA. Finland falls significantly short of the 0.7 target and thus none of the climate finance provided can be considered additional to ODA, as shown in Figure 1.

Relative to the other DAC members, the Nordic countries commit a relatively high share of their gross national income to climate finance. Norway, Denmark, and Sweden are the top contributors according to this metric with shares of 0.14%, 0.12% and 0.10% respectively, followed by France and Japan who both committed approximately 0.10%. Finland falls slightly behind with a share of 0.09%. Only four other countries provided above 0.05% of their GNI as climate finance – German, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium.



**Figure 1:** ODA contributions of the Nordic countries and amount of (grant equivalent) climate finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI. Includes climate-specific finance (i.e., bilateral and donor contributions to multilateral organisations earmarked for specific purposes) and core contributions to multilateral institutions (imputed multilateral contributions). Data presented for 2021. Grant equivalent finance derived from the OECD-DAC CRS (OECD, 2023b). ODA and GNI sourced from the OECD.Stat database (OECD, n.d.-b).

## Chapter 5: Gender integration in Nordic climate finance

This chapter aims to understand the degree to which gender is integrated in the Nordic countries’ climate finance programmes. First, Nordic reporting on gender integration in climate finance reporting to the UNFCCC is assessed, through the Biennial Reports (BRs) and biennial communications to Article 9.5. An overview of the level of gender integration in Nordic climate finance using the OECD-DAC CRS dataset is then provided. This includes analysis of the distribution of gender equality objectives between adaptation, mitigation, and cross-cutting projects, as well as an analysis of the relative levels of gender integration across different sectors, recipients, and implementation channels.

### UNFCCC REPORTING

Annex II nations are required to report their climate finance flows (ex-post) to the UNFCCC through their Biennial Reports, as well as their projected future (ex-ante) climate finance provisions through Biennial Communications per Article 9.5.

The UNFCCC biennial report tables for climate finance do not have a specific space for including gender information, however there is room to voluntarily provide this information and Sweden have elected to report the proportion of their overall climate finance which has an associated gender equality marker of significant or principal i.e., has gender integrated according to OECD standards (OECD-DAC GENDERNET, 2016). In the BR5, Sweden reported that 79% of its climate finance was gender integrated in the year 2020. The level of gender integration reported by Sweden for bilateral climate finance has fallen slightly year on year, though nonetheless remains high. The largest decrease is seen from 2019 to 2020 and is attributed to quality assurance of data (Sweden Ministry of Climate and Enterprise, 2023).

The Biennial Communications pursuant to Article 9.5 have a specific chapter assigned to “*Information on policies and priorities, including regions and geography, recipient countries, beneficiaries, targeted groups, sectors and gender responsiveness*” (UNFCCC, 2023a). This paves the way for submissions to outline to what degree their climate finance will be gender responsive in the coming years. All of the Nordic countries mention gender

as a consideration or objective for their climate finance but largely fail to provide further details of this, with no statements of intent on the degree to which finance will be gender responsive.

#### THE OECD'S CLIMATE FINANCE DATASET

When reporting to the OECD-DAC donors are requested assess the extent to which their bilateral ODA addresses gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls through the gender equality policy marker (GEM). The GEM is based on activities at the planning and design phase, and states that an activity should be classified as addressing gender equality if “*it is intended to advance gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls or reduce discrimination and inequalities based on sex*” (OECD, 2023a, p. 95).

The GEM operate on a three-tier scoring system where a score of principal (2) is assigned when the objective is fundamental in the design or motivation of the project, a score of significant (1) is assigned when the objective is important but not the fundamental driver or motivation, and not targeted (0) is assigned when a project is found not to target gender in any significant way. Utilising the gender markers, it is possible to estimate and analyse the flows of climate-related development finance that target gender equality as a policy objective.

Gender equality markers are mandatory when reporting grants and concessional climate finance to the OECD and voluntary for non-concessional finance. Indeed, the Nordics are comprehensive in applying gender markers to their climate-related ODA with only a few minor exceptions which are left blank. This provides important transparency on the subject.


#### GENDER INTEGRATION IN CLIMATE FINANCE ACROSS THE NORDICS

For all Nordic countries combined, the level of gender integration (i.e. finance with a GEM of principal or significant) in climate-specific grants and concessional loans showed a general increase from 38% in 2012 to 51% in 2019 but has since declined to around 40%. This means that approximately 60% of climate finance committed by the Nordic countries in the last two years does not consider gender as a policy objective. Even at the peak of 56% in 2018, these figures remain too low to consider Nordic climate finance to be truly gender responsive.

It is also important to consider the share of climate finance that integrates gender equality as a principal objective. The share of climate-specific grants and concessional loans assigned a gender marker of principal has decreased on average for the Nordics - in 2018 9% was assigned a gender marker of principal and this subsequently dropped to 2% in all proceeding years.

There are variations between the individual Nordic nations. The level of gender integration in Swedish finance has remained high in all years, having increased sharply in 2014 with the introduction of a feminist foreign policy. It has, however, fallen somewhat in recent years from a high of 93% in 2017 to 72% in 2021. Denmark and Finland fall somewhat behind Sweden. Gender integration in Danish climate-specific grants and concessional loans decreased year-on-year from 2015 to 2020 from a peak of 84% in 2015 to a low of 38%, and this recovered only somewhat to 48% in 2021. Gender integration in Finnish climate-specific grants and concessional loans peaked at 84% in 2017, but subsequently fell to 46% in 2019 and 47% in 2020 before rising to 64% in 2021. Norway reports the lowest levels of gender integration of the Nordics – in 2021 just 19% of Norwegian climate finance was reported with a gender marker of significant or principal.

Considering the climate finance assigned a principal gender marker, Sweden likewise reports the highest amount of the Nordic countries, but this has also decreased significantly in recent years. For the other Nordics, the proportion of climate finance committed with a gender marker of principal is extremely low.



**Figure 2:** Share of gender integration (% with a gender equality marker of 1 or 2) in Nordic countries' climate-specific grants and concessional loans.

### GENDER INTEGRATION ACROSS DIFFERENT OBJECTIVES AND SECTORS


Across the years and countries, there is a higher level of gender integration in the climate-specific grants and concessional loans that target adaptation and cross-cutting objectives compared to finance that targets mitigation objectives. In 2021, for example, combining all Nordic countries 61% of adaptation finance and 60% of cross-cutting finance had a gender marker of either significant or principal, compared to just 29% of mitigation finance. There was, however, a significant drop in the level of gender integration in cross-cutting finance for all countries from 2018 to 2019, and the level remained low in 2020 and 2021.

While there is a very low proportion of finance reported with a principal gender equality marker across all objectives, it can also be seen that there are more principal gender equality markers in adaptation finance than mitigation finance. In 2021, 3% of adaptation finance and 9% of cross-cutting finance had a gender marker of principal, compared to 0% of mitigation finance.

Norway provides a particularly large amount of mitigation finance, which has very low levels of gender integration. This mitigation bias provides an explanation for the low levels of gender integration in their overall climate finance.

The Nordics also show lower levels of gender integration in particular sectors and sub-sectors. The largest sector across the 10-year period of the study is general environment protection. In 2021, for example, this sector accounted for 35% of all Nordic climate-specific grants and concessional loans. Most of this is committed by Norway, whose finance is overwhelmingly directed toward this sector, while the other Nordic countries spread their finance more evenly across sectors. The other main sectors financed by the Nordics are i) energy, ii) agriculture, forestry and fishing, iii) other multisector, iv) government and civil society and v) water supply and sanitation.

The general environment protection sector and energy sectors receive the largest amounts of climate-specific grants and concessional loans from the Nordic countries, but only a very small proportion of this finance also reports that gender equality is either a significant or principal objective. In line with the finding that mitigation projects have lower levels of gender integration, most of the finance within these sectors also targets mitigation. In contrast, the other large sectors funded by the Nordics have much higher levels of gender integration. These sectors also have a much higher balance between objectives, and a greater focus on adaptation finance. While the higher level of gender integration in these sectors is welcomed, accelerated efforts are needed to ensure that gender equality is embedded in the design of all programmes within these key sectors.



**Figure 3:** Gender markers assigned to the climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by the Nordic countries, broken down by objective. Data displayed for all Nordic countries combined. The darkest shade of colour (e.g., dark green for adaptation finance) represents finance with a gender marker of principal while the lighter shade represents finance with a gender marker of significant. Light grey represents finance with a gender marker of zero, indicating that the finance has been screened and found not to target gender. Dark grey indicates finance with a gender marker that has been left blank, indicating that it has not been screened for gender.

Most of the finance committed under the general environmental protection sector is directed toward the environmental policy and administrative management sub-sector - 80% in 2021. This sector is so large that in 2021 it contributed 28% of the total 1662 million USD in climate-specific grants and concessional loans. Mitigation programmes focussed within this subsector tend to be those with the lowest levels of gender integration. In 2021, 0% of finance assigned to the subsector had a gender marker of principal and just 12% had a gender marker of significant, meaning that 88% of finance did not consider gender equality. In 2021, the subsector accounted for 50% of all Nordic finance committed with a gender marker of zero.

#### GENDER INTEGRATION ACCORDING TO RECIPIENT COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS

Recipient countries in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) receive the highest proportion of gender-responsive climate finance committed by the Nordic countries. In 2021, for example, 64% of the climate-specific grants and concessional loans directed toward the LDCs had a gender equality marker of significant and 2% had a gender equality marker of principal. The relatively high proportion of gender-responsive finance committed to LDCs should be lauded, as it is money flowing to some of the most climate-vulnerable communities in the world. In contrast, the Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs), such as El Salvador and Philippines, and the Upper Middle-Income Countries (UMICs), such as Botswana and Ecuador, receive far lower levels of gender-responsive climate finance from the Nordics.

This finding is largely replicated when analysing the geographical region of the recipient, with South of Sahara countries (predominantly LDCs) receiving relatively high proportions of gender-responsive finance while there are real challenges in providing gender integrated finance to South American countries (predominantly UMICs). Far East Asian countries (also predominantly LMICs) have very low levels of gender responsive finance, which is not wholly explained by their economic classification. However, both South America and Far East Asia receive the largest share of their finance from Norway, and this is

largely directed toward mitigation projects within the general environment protection sector, reflecting the trends seen in gender integration across objectives and sectors.

## Chapter 6: Assessment of implementation of gender in climate development cooperation

After having established the extent to which gender is integrated in the climate finance committed by the Nordic countries in Chapter 5, this chapter continues by assessing the quality of this integration through assessments of a sample of projects and programmes. The qualitative assessment critically examines how gender integration is operationalized in the projects and whether they seek to foster transformative changes in power relations. The assessment shows that while most projects entail a gender analysis, these often lack sufficient intersectional details on the differences in vulnerabilities, distribution of resources, opportunities, and power structures between genders. Too often, climate projects treat gender as a mere tick box exercise.

Independent of the quality of the gender analysis, there is a tendency for project narratives to not properly reflect the findings of the gender analysis and fail to use this to inform the design of the project. There is an absence of translation of the findings into action or concrete activities that can be considered gender responsive with transformative outcomes. Increased gender responsive focus within specific activities could be achieved, for example, through gender specific indicators in the results framework, thereby making gender transformative action an integrated part of the project.

Furthermore, there is a lack of consideration of safeguarding measures in the sampled projects, and many are found to take for granted or overlook the risk of unintentionally perpetuating gender inequalities despite having an extensive risk analysis. The undertaken risk analyses tend to look predominantly at external factors and not at the risks associated with their own initiatives. This element of reflexivity of gender mainstreaming is missing from much of the documentation and their narratives. These observations are specifically noteworthy considering that a ‘do-no-harm’ approach is to be adopted in every project that has a significant gender equality marker as a minimum standard (OECD-DAC GENDERNET, 2016). However, there are also strong examples to learn from, such as the Danish funded *Durable Solutions in Somalia 2017-20* project (CRS ID 2017001304). Its project documentation acknowledges the risk of a gender focus negatively affecting households and women, and not only seeks to mitigate these potential risks, but also addresses underlying patriarchal norms and power relations.

The assessments have shown a general tendency to equate gender integration as an exercise of ‘adding’ women as beneficiaries. There are continuous gaps in achieving women’s full and meaningful participation as well as increasing women’s economic empowerment specifically through green technology, which is one of the commitments in the enhanced GAP (UNFCCC, 2019a). With reference to capacities within a project’s implementation team and management, there is a lack of clarity in ensuring gender competency or capacity building towards a gender transformative approach. In concurrence with the findings of Chapter 5, the qualitative assessment finds a lack of women’s empowerment or participation in green technology sectors. Mitigation-related initiatives tend to reflect a dominant gender-neutral mindset. The assumption that mitigation projects are not relevant for gender mainstreaming remains largely unchallenged (Zusman et al., 2016).

By assessing projects that have been marked with a GEM of principal or significant, or that have not been marked at all, the study aimed to consider whether the OECD Gender Equality markers are relevant and coherent, as well as understanding what the key differences between the markers are. While it cannot be claimed that the markers as such are flawed, the assessments show substantial discrepancies in their application. The differences derive, amongst other things, from varying understandings of what gender mainstreaming entails, for example in terms of terminology, e.g., gender integration, gender sensitive programming, gender mainstreaming and gender targeting. It further needs to be realized that the GEM reporting is at the commitment level, rather than outcomes/disbursements. The achievement of a gender transformative approach requires a stronger GAP implementation and Biennial reporting incorporating gender to the UNFCCC.



Despite this, there are many best practice examples of gender integration in climate projects from the Nordics, that can serve to showcase and inspire both enhanced processes in their own countries as well as for other countries. For example, the Swedish *Energia* project (CRS ID 2018061548A) is seen to integrate gender well at all levels of the project and gives a clear example of how gender can be effectively integrated into a mitigation project.

## Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations

It is clear across the development policies and strategies of the four Nordic countries that they are committed to both climate action and gender equality. However, there is inconsistency in gender integration across climate finance provided by Denmark, Finland, and in particular Norway (and to a lesser extent, Sweden). For these countries, there should now be a focus on ensuring consistency of gender integration in climate activities through a focus on the gender-blind areas identified in this report. Assumptions over which types of projects are relevant to have gender mainstreaming need to be challenged as part of these efforts, in order to achieve consistently high levels of gender-responsive climate finance.

The example of Sweden highlights the opportunities for transparency in reporting on gender integration in climate finance to the UNFCCC and the potential of effectively applying policy commitments through to the project level, having maintained consistently high levels of gender-responsive climate finance across sectors and objectives, including mitigation.

The findings of this report should be taken forward to more effectively target the gaps identified in integrating gender in various sectors, programmes, recipients, and regions in the global climate finance regime. Based on the conclusions of this report, the following recommendations are made:

**Recommendation 1:** The Nordic countries develop on Sweden's leadership in voluntary reporting on gender integration by submitting gender equality marker data at the project-level in their Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, for tracking purposes and to encourage and inspire other Annex II nations to do the same.

**Recommendation 2:** The Nordic countries collectively advocate for the tracking of gender in climate finance to be integrated into the Common Tabular Format template for reporting to the UNFCCC (and EU Governance Regulation).

**Recommendation 3:** The Nordic countries set out their plans for gender integration in climate finance in their future 9.5 communications to the UNFCCC through the use of ambitious and measurable targets, to provide predictable and reliable gender-responsive climate finance to recipient nations and inspire others to do likewise.

**Recommendation 4:** Denmark, Finland, and Norway should increase considerably the proportion of their climate finance commitments which have gender integrated, by taking a twin-track approach as recommended by the OECD-DAC GENDERNET (2016) which combines dedicated interventions (gender marker of 2) with gender mainstreaming (gender marker of 1).

**Recommendation 5:** The Nordic countries should increase efforts to ensure high quality gender equality tracking internally and externally through the OECD-DAC Gender Equality Marker framework, to improve reliability in reporting. Quality assurance of gender markers is recommended.

**Recommendation 6:** UNFCCC Annex II nations, including the Nordic countries, take a targeted approach to ensuring consistent gender integration in climate finance by building capacity in mitigation-related sectors (i.e., energy and forestry sectors).

**Recommendation 7:** The Nordic countries ensure gender integration is consistent in their climate commitments across recipient countries, especially in more economically developed recipient nations.

**Recommendation 8:** Nordic nations ensure that gender analyses are not performed as tick-box exercises but inform the design of concrete actions within activities where relevant and based on the good experiences presented in this report. Transformative gender approaches should be promoted.

**Recommendation 9:** Implementing organisations develop a continuous learning platform to upgrade knowledge from best practice. This includes creating a mutual learning environment with CSOs and NGOs (both in developed and developing countries) to improve levels and quality of gender integration in climate finance portfolios for all parties.

**Recommendation 10:** The Nordic countries collectively advocate for the establishment of gender integration sub-goals as part of the post-2025 climate finance negotiations.



# 1. Introduction

The Nordic countries have maintained a strong focus on gender equality for many years and are often perceived as leading nations globally in protecting women's rights (World Economic Forum, 2023). Gender has been mainstreamed into much of the Nordics' foreign policy, including, to a certain extent, their development policy and cooperation. The purpose of this report is to assess the level of gender integration in the climate-related development finance provided to developing countries by Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden (henceforth referred to as the "Nordic countries") in the period 2012-2021 and develop recommendations about gender mainstreaming in climate finance.

The report is structured as follows. First, Chapter 2 outlines the international context and case for the provision of gender-responsive climate finance. Chapter 3 assesses the policy framework in place in each of the four Nordic countries through review of strategic documents and country-level policies covering the areas of climate, gender equality and development. Chapter 4 estimates the amounts of climate finance committed by the Nordic countries and discusses these commitments relative to other rich nations. Chapter 5 provides an overview of how the Nordic countries report on gender in climate finance to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and analyses data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation (OECD) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) to understand the degree to which gender is integrated in their climate finance projects and programmes. Chapter 6 continues by assessing the quality of this integration through assessments of a sample of projects and programmes. The report concludes with a summary of the findings and related recommendations.

This report provides an update to a study that was presented at COP26 in Glasgow in 2021<sup>2</sup>. The previous report analysed gender integration in climate finance flows for the period 2012-2019 and included qualitative analysis of gender responsiveness through in-depth studies of specific projects committed in the years 2017 and 2018. In this version, the period of study is updated to also projects and programmes committed in 2020 and 2021.

This study has been commissioned by DanChurchAid, Felm, Finn Church Aid, Act Church of Sweden, and Norwegian Church Aid. The first version of this study was conducted by the Danish firm INKA Consult and carried out by consultants Christopher Roy and Sunitha Bisan in collaboration with Verena Nitschke and Lisa Reenberg of DanChurchAid. The update of this study was conducted **pro-bono** by INKA Consult and carried out by consultants Tallulah Cherry-Virdee, Rasmus Bo Sørensen and Hans Peter Dejgaard in collaboration with Signe Skovgaard Madsen, Barbora Koleckova and Cecilie Conrad of DanChurchAid.

The research team would like to thank the various ACT Alliance members, NGOs, Nordic Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development Agencies, and other resource persons for their valuable contributions to this report.

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<sup>2</sup> [From Words to Action - Lessons From Nordic Efforts to Integrate Gender Equality in Climate Finance](#)

## 2. Climate Finance and Gender Equality

### 2.1. Climate justice, gender, and climate finance

There is increasing recognition of the need to simultaneously address the cross-cutting issues of climate change and gender justice in a way that empowers those most vulnerable and addresses persisting inequalities. This recognizes that gender power structures are a major factor in deciding an individual's vulnerability to climate impacts as well as their capacity to respond. Climate change and its solutions can worsen existing gender-based inequities and further contribute to marginalization. This is particularly important for communities in least developed countries which have high climate exposure and vulnerability combined with the lowest adaptive capacities (IPCC, 2014; Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative, 2017) but also a low responsibility for climate change (Barrett, 2013).

The IPCC Sixth Assessment Report states that vulnerability to climate change is exacerbated by marginalization and inequities linked to gender as well as other intersecting socioeconomic factors such as ethnicity and income (IPCC, 2023). The intersections between socioeconomic inequalities, gender norms and other factors of discrimination limit women's access to income, resources, land, health, and political participation. Due to embedded gender roles, women are often the primary caregiver in their households and contribute a disproportionate share of primarily unpaid care and reproductive work including responsibilities for securing food, water, and fuel. Women do the greatest amount of subsistence farming to provide for their families and they are more often involved in the protection of natural resources (CARE International, 2020). While they may rely on natural resources for their livelihoods, access, control, and ownership of these resources is often distributed based on gender.

Women and men also contribute to responses to climate change in different ways and have differing capabilities to adapt and mitigate climate change based on their knowledge and experiences. While often unrecognized, women play a critical role in the conservation and use of natural resources or are engaged in sectors related to adaptation and mitigation, such as agriculture, energy, forestry, and ecosystem protection. Often seen as just the victims of climate change, it is important to recognise women as agents of change in the climate crisis.

Despite being disproportionately affected by climate change, women's role in climate action remains limited due to the barriers they face such as restricted land rights, limited education and training, and lack of decision-making powers. Unequal participation in decision and policy-making processes and the institutions that govern them prevent women from fully contributing to climate-related planning, policy making, and implementation. Women's extensive knowledge on local circumstances and experience of climate change are often neglected in decision-making processes (Kernecker et al., 2017). The UNFCCC states that "*The inequitable distribution of rights, resources, power, and norms constrains many people's ability to take action on climate change. This is especially true for women and vulnerable groups*" (UNFCCC, 2015b, pg.7).

At the same time, flows of climate finance are being leveraged from developed countries to developing countries as a crucial part of the transition to a low-carbon, resilient future, and a tool for achieving climate justice. Within this context, it is important that flows of climate finance consider the needs and priorities of the most vulnerable groups in society and ensure meaningful participation in decision-making at all levels. As a matter of climate justice, climate finance must be gender responsive in order to address the injustice experienced by those who have contributed the least to climate change but who are suffering the most from its impacts. This means conducting activities that are gender sensitive or gender transformative (UNFPA, 2020). If gender sensitivity is not ingrained in climate-related development finance, there is a risk that gender inequalities will be exacerbated (Alston, 2013). This requires understanding which populations are more vulnerable to climate change impacts and ensuring that vulnerable communities have the capacity to adapt.

Integrating women as decision-makers and change agents in climate finance is not only important from a justice and human rights perspective, with increasing political legitimacy (see Section 2.2) but also to

enhance efficacy and ensure sustainable outcomes. Action to correct gender inequality (as seen in SDG 5) in the face of climate risks is paramount to achieving effective and equitable climate action (SDG 13) that follows the fundamental SDG principle of “*leave no one behind*” (Aguilar, 2007). There is also growing evidence that it would bring better economic outcomes (Woetzel et al., 2015) and impact in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals beyond just SDG5 (Klugman et al., 2014). As such, the conclusion has been drawn for over a decade that gender responsive climate finance is “*smart climate finance*” (Schalatek, 2009).

Gender-inclusive finance approaches are important within climate finance policy, programmes, and procedures as well as all phases of a projects cycle from design and implementation to monitoring and evaluation. Effective responses to climate change also require an understanding of how gender inequalities affect issues such as access to and control of resources; institutional structures; social, cultural, and formal networks and decision-making processes. Gender mainstreaming based on gender analysis must, therefore, be an integral part of climate policy and action.

## 2.2. Gender equality under the UNFCCC

To address the synergy between climate and gender, the UNFCCC launched the Lima Work Programme on Gender (LWPG) in 2014 (UNFCCC, 2014). The LWPG was prolonged a further three years in 2016, leading to the adoption of a two-year Gender Action Plan (GAP) in 2017. In 2019 the UNFCCC adopted a five-year Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender and its Gender Action Plan (UNFCCC, 2019a). UNFCCC decision 3/CP.25 also encourages the establishment of the role of a National Gender & Climate Change Focal Point for climate negotiations, implementation, and monitoring (UNFCCC, 2019b). Beyond the GAP, gender is also referenced at least once in a COP decision related to every major thematic area of the negotiations (Burns & Daniel, 2020). The Nordic countries and their civil society organisations have been important actors in establishing gender considerations in the Paris Agreement and supporting the establishment of the GAP and the Gender Focal Points.

The enhanced GAP reflects the need for integrating gender responsiveness throughout national level action on addressing climate change. The GAP contains five priority areas, each of which has a series of sub-activities (see Table 1). While all of the priority areas - and many of the activities - relate indirectly to climate finance, activity D.2 specifically indicates this need - “*D.2 Raise awareness of the financial and technical support available for promoting the strengthening of gender integration into climate policies, plans, strategies and action, as appropriate, including good practices to facilitate access to climate finance for grass-roots women’s organizations and indigenous peoples and local communities*” (UNFCCC, 2019a, pg. 8). Climate finance is also written into the decision text of the adoption of the gender action plan, where the Conference of the Parties “*invite[s] relevant public and private entities to increase the gender-responsiveness of climate finance with a view to strengthening the capacity of women*” (UNFCCC, 2019a, pg. 2).

The inclusion of climate finance in these texts is a recognition of the often gender-blind climate finance architecture (Burns & Daniel, 2020). While many institutions claim to have a gender-sensitive approach, the implementation of this promise is not always delivered. As the international regime relating to gender integration in climate finance is not well established, it is a long way before it can be claimed that a gender-just climate transition is being promoted through the expenditure of climate finance (Schalatek, 2014).

The continued risk of a fragmented climate finance regime - containing a patchwork of interlocking actors, policies and institutions - the lack of coordination, harmonisation, and standardisation (combined with a lack of mandatory reporting mechanism to the UNFCCC) means that it is first and foremost difficult to track gender integration in climate finance as a third party, and secondly difficult to assess the quality of the integration that is present (Amerasinghe et al., 2017; Biermann et al., 2009; Gomez-Echeverri, 2013).

Priority Area A – Capacity-building, knowledge management and communication (5 associated activities)	To enhance the systematic integration of gender considerations into climate policy and action and the application of understanding and expertise to the actions called for under the Lima work programme on gender and its gender action plan, and facilitate outreach, knowledge-sharing and the communication of activities undertaken to enhance gender-responsive climate action and its impacts in advancing women’s leadership, achieving gender equality, and ensuring effective climate action.
Priority Area B – Gender balance, participation, and women’s leadership (3 associated activities)	To achieve and sustain the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women in the UNFCCC process.
Priority Area C – Coherence (3 associated activities)	To strengthen the integration of gender considerations within the work of UNFCCC constituted bodies, the secretariat and other United Nations entities and stakeholders towards the consistent implementation of gender-related mandates and activities.
Priority Area D – Gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation (7 associated activities)	To ensure the respect, promotion and consideration of gender equality and the empowerment of women in the implementation of the Convention and the Paris Agreement.
Priority Area E – Monitoring and reporting (2 associated activities)	To improve tracking of the implementation of and reporting on gender-related mandates under the Lima work programme on gender and its gender action plan.

**Table 1:** The five priority areas of the UNFCCC’s Gender Action Plan, direct quotations (UNFCCC, 2019a).

### 2.3. The 100bn USD climate finance international goal and future climate finance developments

At COP15 in 2009 in Copenhagen, the UNFCCC noted a collective goal to mobilise \$100bn USD of climate finance annually, to be met by the UNFCCC Annex II countries. This goal was then formally adopted at COP16 in 2010 in Cancun.

*“In the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. This funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance.”*

(UNFCCC, 2009), Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen)

The pledge of 100bn USD has been reiterated at international negotiations since 2009, most notably as part of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015a). The 2010 Cancun Agreements and the 2015 Paris Agreement both supplement the \$100bn pledge by calling for a balance to be struck between finance targeting adaptation and mitigation objectives.

The Nordic Countries are all signatories to the Paris Agreement and are in the Annex II grouping under the UNFCCC (UNFCCC, 2019c) obligating them to contribute towards this collective climate finance goal. Additionally, as stipulated by article 9.7 of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015a), the UNFCCC Annex II nations must report their climate finance accounts in their Biennial Reports (BR) to the UNFCCC. This is recorded using the Common Tabular Format (CTF), specifically through tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) (UNFCCC, 2012), which provide a standardised format for ex-post reporting. The reporting standards of the UNFCCC has a blind spot when it comes to measuring gender impacts, as the CTF reporting template does not have any requirement for tracking the level of gender integration. While the tables do allow for additional information to be provided in relation to the climate-specific projects and programmes recorded under Table 7(b), the guidance for this only state that *“parties should report, as*

*appropriate, on project details and the implementing agency*” in this section. No country has used this column to track gender within climate finance thus far.

In 2015, the Paris Agreement reinforced and extended the annual pledge through to 2025 and outlined that a new collective goal will be set for beyond 2025, above the 100bn USD floor (UNFCCC, 2023b). Negotiations are now focussed on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG), with the aim for this to be established by 2024. Deliberations are structured around a work programme, running from 2022-2024, which includes technical expert dialogues and consultations with Party and non-Party stakeholders.

Actors have begun the process of mapping out what an enhanced climate-finance pledge might look like post-2025 and advocating for climate finance that is gender responsive. Specific suggestions include the possibility of the use of sub-goals (or a matrix of sub-goals) pertaining to particular objectives, for example the percentage of climate finance targeting gender equality objectives (CFAS, 2020).

### 3. Gender Equality Policy Architecture for Climate Finance

The internal capacity of the Nordic countries on gender mainstreaming in climate change is seen as key to advancing gender. This chapter therefore reviews strategic documents and country-level policies covering the areas of climate, gender equality and development for the four Nordic countries.

#### 3.1. Methodology

Policies and strategies from each Nordic country are assessed, with a focus on the three following issues: gender, climate, and development cooperation. It is recognized that the gender mainstreaming frameworks across the Nordic countries have substantive differences based on their national circumstances.

In conducting the qualitative analysis of climate policies, an assessment framework based on the UNFCCC Enhanced Lima work programme on gender and its Gender Action Plan (GAP) was developed. The criteria include, for example, capacity building, knowledge management and communication, women's participation and leadership in climate action, gender-responsive implementation, and gender sensitive monitoring and reporting. Gender and development policies were assessed using a simpler framework to understand how these policies address gender differentiated impacts of climate change and women's participation in climate-related policy processes including access to resources and economic opportunities. The full assessment frameworks can be found in Annex A.1.

Based on the varying architecture within the Nordic countries at the policy level, it has been challenging to clearly identify these three types of policies. For the first launch of the report, meetings with the Gender Focal Points from all four countries were organised in order to gain a deeper understanding of the internal procedures and guiding documents on gender integration in climate action. In the case of Sweden, Norway and Finland, the team was forwarded to relevant advisors from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and development agencies, while the team successfully consulted with the Gender Focal Point, as well as other relevant advisors, in the case of Denmark. The following section summarises the findings from the assessments of the policies and provides an overview of the structures for each country, based on the meetings and other guiding documents.

#### 3.2. Denmark

Denmark had their latest election in 2022 and, although the Prime Minister remained the same, the government structure changed from a purely social democratic government to a coalition across the middle. Some of the current policies and strategies on gender, climate and development reflect the work of the previous government whereas some have been drafted by the new government.

In 2000, the Gender Equality Act introduced gender mainstreaming to the national legislation of Denmark<sup>3</sup>. This legislation states that public authorities should attempt to advance and incorporate gender equality in all planning and administration. These gender mainstreaming efforts are assessed in relation to Denmark's climate policy and climate-related aspects in development and gender policy.

The Danish Government's long-term strategy for global climate action *A Green and Sustainable World*<sup>4</sup> does not explicitly integrate gender. The only mention of gender in the strategy is in reference to the opportunities of synergy between a green transition, climate adaptation, and gender equality. Women are referenced in relation to how investments in education and women's and girls' Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) could contribute to breaking the population curve. Neither of these statements are translated into strategic initiatives or direct commitments in Denmark's strategy. The lack of a more

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<sup>3</sup> [Denmark's Act on Gender Equality 2000](#)

<sup>4</sup> [A Green and Sustainable World – The Danish Government's long-term strategy for global climate action](#)

explicit gender framework reduces the ability to mainstream gender and highlights a lacklustre commitment to the integration of gender in climate policies.

In Denmark's previous strategy for development for 2017-2021<sup>5</sup>, there was a clear disconnect between gender, sustainable growth and the climate. The only explicit objective addressing the intersection of gender and sustainability was in relation to women's SRHR and population growth. Thus, women were not seen as agents of change, but rather as means to an end.

Denmark's current strategy for development and cooperation for 2021-2025 is laid forth in *The World We Share*<sup>6</sup>, in which Denmark calls themselves and other Nordic countries pioneers in gender equality. In this strategy, gender equality is outlined as part of the foundation for Denmark's development cooperation, and a "long standing Danish core priority"<sup>7</sup>. The strategy addresses the link between women's economic and political empowerment and economic growth, as well as the link between access to modern energy and advanced gender equality. Denmark states that gender equality is a cross-cutting priority across development work. However, the only objective which addresses the nexus of climate and gender risks perpetuating gender inequalities. The strategy only highlights gender equality through clean energy in the home; this shows a lacklustre commitment to integrating women in all levels of the energy sector, which is highly male dominated. Thus, gender is still not fully integrated, as women are yet to be included as agents of change.

In Denmark's expenditure framework for priorities for development cooperation for 2022-2025<sup>8</sup>, 'gender' is only mentioned in reference to gender-based violence. This once again negates the role of women as agents of change.

In contrast, the *Strategic Framework on Gender Equality* (2014)<sup>9</sup> addresses the differential impacts of climate change on men and women. Furthermore, it also specifically focuses on women living in poverty, thereby applying an intersectional approach to a certain extent. The framework promotes capacity-building, gender-balanced involvement in climate mitigation measures and involvement in decision-making. The focus lies on women's participation in green growth, including them in climate related activities, access to resources and land, etc. The policy supports this with concrete examples from different projects and programmes. The *Strategic Framework on Gender Equality* supports a gender transformative approach. However, in the 2023 *Perspective and Action Plan*<sup>10</sup> on gender equality, which includes a short section on global gender equality efforts, climate change is only mentioned once as one of many causes of migration. There is no mention of climate in the plan's initiatives on gender equality.

In the meeting with ministry representatives, internal policy guidance for aid management was highlighted as an assessment and planning tool that integrates gender. Annex 1 of the policy guidance entails a context analysis tool, which includes a human rights-based and gender transformative approach. However, the conclusions and implications on gender are not thorough. There are generic points on identifying challenges and opportunities for gender equality, international agreements and recommendations that could be relevant, and social and gender norms that could be barriers. Adaptive yet strategic actions that should be taken in response to those findings are missing. Thus, the mere existence of the tool does not necessarily mean that gender is meaningfully integrated into a programme or project.

### 3.3. Finland

Since the first launch of this report, Finland has voted in a new government which increasingly directs attention to more liberal tendencies of investment and trade in development policies. Some of the current

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<sup>5</sup> [The World 2030 - Denmark's strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action](#)

<sup>6</sup> [THE WORLD WE SHARE - Denmark's Strategy for Development Cooperation](#)

<sup>7</sup> [THE WORLD WE SHARE - Denmark's Strategy for Development Cooperation](#) p. 14

<sup>8</sup> [The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation 2022](#)

<sup>9</sup> [Strategic Framework for Gender Equality, Rights and Diversity in Danish Development Cooperation](#)

<sup>10</sup> [Redegørelse/perspektiv- og handlingsplan for ligestilling 2023](#)



policies and strategies on gender, climate and development reflect the work of the previous government whereas some have been drafted by the new government.

Finland, like the other Nordic countries, considers itself a pioneer on gender equality. Gender equality and climate change are two of the five cross-cutting objectives of Finnish development work. The gender equality crosscutting objective includes the aim of introducing gender sensitive policies, services, and institutions in all sectors and provides concrete steps on how gender can be either mainstreamed or be a targeted action. The *Guideline for the Cross-Cutting Objectives in the Finnish Development Policy and Cooperation (2023)*<sup>11</sup> highlights that development work should not exacerbate existing inequalities with a ‘do no harm’ approach as a minimum standard. The guideline emphasizes the need to acknowledge the gendered impacts of all development work and aims to guide the advancement of gender equality in all development policies and activities. This is a continuum of their human rights-based approach.

The audit report *Finland’s International Climate Finance: Steering and Effectiveness (2021)*<sup>12</sup> found that climate projects generally had a positive effect on women. However, in the same report, the attention to gender equality rarely included indicators or mechanisms of monitoring or reporting results, which may suggest that gender attentive climate finance is merely manifested as good intentions in strategies without the necessary instruments of implementation or monitoring. The same report highlighted gender-disaggregated data as an objective but found that some projects did not consider that its impacts may have a gendered layer. Gender-disaggregated data is also an objective recommended by the Finnish Development Committee, in *Finland’s Climate Financing Needs a Clear Direction (2022)*<sup>13</sup>, which also reiterates the importance of including women in climate action.

The *Development Policy Investment Plan for 2020-2023*<sup>14</sup> presents the goal that 75% of development investments should be directed towards climate finance of which 85% of the climate finance investments should be distributed to projects with a gender equality focus. However, despite the commitment to both gender quality and climate change in Finnish development strategies, the only link between gender and climate in the 2023 government program is SRHR education as the “key to curbing population growth”<sup>15</sup>, which once again reduces women and girls as a means to an end rather than agents of change.

In the plan for implementation of Finland’s public international climate finance for 2022-2026<sup>16</sup>, gender equality is once listed as a cross-cutting objective, yet there is no meaningful integration of gender in the plan. It does mention promoting women in leadership in previous climate efforts, as well as the importance of defining and setting boundaries on funds’ performances’ implication for the status of women and girls. The lack of attention to gender in the plan for implementing climate finance is in direct contradiction to the goal of having a gender equality focus in 85% of Finnish climate finance as was put forth in the *Development Policy Investment Plan for 2020-2023*.

### 3.4. Norway

Shortly before the first launch of this report, Norway elected in a new government. This meant a shift from a more conservative government to a coalition of the labour and centre party. Some of the current policies and strategies on gender, climate and development reflect the work of the previous government whereas some have been drafted by the new government.

Norway highlights gender equality as a special focus across all development cooperation. This is especially highlighted in relation to the energy sector, where different needs, roles and priorities are stated<sup>17</sup>. However, there is nothing concrete on how this will be addressed in Norway’s development work. The

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<sup>11</sup> [Guideline for the cross-cutting objectives in the Finnish Development Policy and Cooperation](#)

<sup>12</sup> [Finland’s international climate finance – steering and effectiveness](#)

<sup>13</sup> [Finland’s climate financing needs a clear definition – Development Policy Committee Analysis](#)

<sup>14</sup> [Finland’s Development Policy Investment Plan for 2020-2023](#)

<sup>15</sup> [A strong and committed Finland - Programme of Prime Minister Petteri Orpo's Government](#)

<sup>16</sup> [Plan for implementation of Finland's public international climate finance for 2022-2026](#)

<sup>17</sup> [NORAD How we work](#)



inclusion of women in several layers of their climate related thematic areas is evident, and with references to women as meaningful participants as well as beneficiaries of development.

Norway's development policy framework *Investing in a Common Future* (2023) mentions gender equality as an integral objective and consideration in all development work. The framework goes on to mention climate adaptation and gender equality as direct intervention areas, as well as cross-cutting considerations in other interventions. This potential, however, is not addressed anywhere else in the document. The framework presents the goal that at least 50% of all bilateral investment should have a gender focus. Despite this goal and a paragraph that highlights the importance of gender equality in development work, the rest of the framework does not mention gender in any of the other chapters or subchapters.

*Climate Change, Hunger and Vulnerability* (2023)<sup>18</sup>, Norway's strategy to scale up adaptation efforts as pledged at COP26 in Glasgow, is detailed, ambitious and contains specific initiatives but does not mention gender at all. The policy acknowledges that women are often affected more severely by extreme weather events due to socially constructed roles and responsibilities. The strategy also highlights that Norway should be dedicated to addressing the inequality that women experience and the need to consider the disparities in the situations of men and women. However, this acknowledgement is not reflected in any indicators, targets or plans in the strategy, which shows a low level of commitment to gender integration and meaningful mainstreaming in climate policies.

The lack of gender integration in climate policies is further demonstrated in Norway's *Climate Action Plan for 2021-2030*<sup>19</sup>, which is a several-hundred-page elaborate plan for Norway's climate action that does not mention gender and only references women once in relation to their meat consumption. Likewise, Norway's *Climate Strategy for 2030: a transformational approach within a European cooperation framework*<sup>20</sup>, is in general highly detailed with concrete indicators and targets for Norway yet does not mention 'gender' or 'women' once.

In the 2023 action plan on gender equality *En rettferdig verden er en likestilt verden*<sup>21</sup> (A Just World is an Equal World), it is noted that climate change has the potential to exacerbate existing gender inequalities due to gendered structural barriers. The action plan integrates women in several levels of climate action as relevant actors and agents of change, and points out how structural barriers limit the meaningful participation of women in climate action. It moves on to outline the necessity of gender integration in adaptation efforts to ensure that interventions do not exacerbate or reproduce gender inequalities. One of the goals of the plan focusses on gender equality in work for climate change, energy, and food production. Sub-goals call for recognition of women as agents of change in these sectors, their equal rights to resources, and calls for meaningful participation of all genders in conservation, natural resource management and climate change work. To ensure this, equality considerations will be included in all assessments on climate, energy and food security interventions and the plan will prioritize measures that strengthen women's participation in decision-making related to climate issues. Overall, this action plan has considerable strategies for gender integration in climate action.

The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) development strategy has been assessed as the main implementing agency of Norway's development aid. Norad's Strategy towards 2030 elaborates on the impacts of climate change but does not refer to differentiated effects for women. It neither promotes women's effective participation in climate policy or action nor does it promote women's participation in resource governance or access to economic opportunities linked to climate change initiatives. While aiming to address "various forms of inequality", gender and women do not come up in any part of the document<sup>22</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> [Climate change, hunger and vulnerability – Strategy for climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction and the fight against hunger](#)

<sup>19</sup> [Norway's Climate Action Plan for 2021–2030](#)

<sup>20</sup> [Norway's Climate Strategy for 2030: A transformational approach within a European cooperation framework](#)

<sup>21</sup> [En rettferdig verden er en likestilt verden](#)

<sup>22</sup> [Norad's strategy towards 2030](#)

### 3.5. Sweden

Since the first launch of this report, Sweden has voted in a more conservative government which increasingly directs attention to more liberal tendencies of investment and trade in development policies. This new government also stated that it was abandoning its feminist foreign policy to prioritize national interests, although gender equality continues to be a fundamental value. Some of the current policies and strategies on gender, climate and development reflect the work of the previous government whereas some have been drafted by the new government.

For a long time and especially since announcing the world's first feminist foreign policy in 2014, Sweden has been a pioneer and at the forefront of gender mainstreaming and gender approaches globally. As of 2023, Sweden remains a forerunner in gender equality approaches, but the shift in government has already showed a regression in ambition on gender equality. The Strategy on *Sweden's Development Cooperation for Global Gender Equality and Women's and Girls' Rights for 2022-2026*<sup>23</sup> states that climate justice is not possible without gender justice. However, the only link made in the rest of the strategy is that climate change has hindered gender equality work, and that women are disproportionately vulnerable to climate change.

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency's (SIDA) work is mainly guided by strategies in specific countries/regions or thematic areas, decided upon by the Swedish government. The strategies set out goals for development cooperation in specific contexts/areas. These strategies often lack detail, including a non-prescriptive nature, which is sometimes seen as an advantage by recipients of Swedish Aid, because aid that is provided to civil society organisations for instance is seldom earmarked. However, as a result there are also fewer minimum standards or criteria that are generally applicable.

*Sweden's 2016 Policy Framework for Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian assistance*<sup>24</sup> describes the overall direction of Swedish development cooperation, as decided by the Swedish government. The document emphasizes that sex-disaggregated data should be used, explains how women are hit harder by climate change and indicates how women particularly can play a significant role in activities concerning climate change. The *Strategy for Sweden's humanitarian aid provided through the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 2021–2025*<sup>25</sup> highlights both gender equality and climate as two of the three thematic areas of work, but the only links made are in reference to women's increased vulnerability to the effects of climate change.

The climate policy *En samlad politik för klimatet – klimatpolitisk handlingsplan*<sup>26</sup> is long and extensive but does not reflect a gender transformative approach. Directed at national initiatives as well as foreign policy, the policy is technical and specific with regard to climate initiatives. The new version of the Swedish climate action plan is scheduled to be released in late 2023, which will be highly focused on energy. So far there is no mention of gender equality<sup>27</sup>. In the strategy for *Sweden's global development cooperation on environment, climate and biodiversity for 2022-2026*<sup>28</sup> gender is not meaningfully included.

The thematic development document *Strategy for Sweden's global development cooperation on sustainable economic development 2022–2026*<sup>29</sup> reflects a more trade-oriented approach to development, where development aid is geared towards economic activities that align with Swedish interests and values. In this strategy the climate is only referenced as a cause for migration, as well as in acknowledgement that previous economic growth has not been good for the climate. In this strategy, gender equality is promoted through economic activity and the strategy references its alignment with the Swedish feminist foreign policy.

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<sup>23</sup> [Strategi for Sveriges Utvecklingssamarbete for Global Jamstalldhet och Kvinnors och Flickors Rattigheter 2022-2026](#)

<sup>24</sup> [Policy framework for Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian assistance – government communication](#)

<sup>25</sup> [Strategy for Sweden's humanitarian aid provided through the Swedish International Cooperation Agency \(Sida\) 2021-2025](#)

<sup>26</sup> [En samlad politik för klimatet - klimatpolitisk handlingsplan](#)

<sup>27</sup> [Ny klimatpolitik för att nå hela vägen till nettonollutsläpp](#)

<sup>28</sup> [Strategi for Sveriges globala utvecklingssamarbete inom miljo, klimat och biologisk mangfald](#)

<sup>29</sup> [Strategy for Sweden's global development cooperation sustainable economic development 2022-2026](#)

In the budget proposal for international aid gender equality is highlighted as a Swedish value. Gender equality is reported to be the main or partial objective in 78% of bilateral aid in 2022 through SIDA<sup>30</sup>. This is a relatively high level of gender consideration, but is the lowest level for Sweden in several years. In both 2018 and 2019, 87% of bilateral aid had gender equality as a main or partial objective. The budget proposal also highlights that more needs to be done as women and girls' condition worsen.

In 2021, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a guidance paper on gender mainstreaming in climate policies for 2022-2025<sup>31</sup>. In this document, the EPA notes that there is a lack of gender equality sub-goals related to the environment and climate. It further notes that the inclusion of women in decision-making positions is relevant to address issues of both climate and gender justice. Furthermore, it elaborates on the potential synergies of climate and gender equality work.

Concerning the overall structure of the Swedish system, SIDA, as the implementing partner of the MFA, is guided by overall policy documents. Issues arise when strategies and guidelines do not interact but rather exist parallel to one another, resulting in an incoherent direction of development and climate finance. For the set-up of new projects and programmes, there are more relevant, hands-on documents such as the SIDA Gender Toolbox<sup>32</sup> and brief on Gender Equality, Environment, and Climate Change<sup>33</sup>, that influence work. The SIDA Gender Toolbox provides extensive, flexible, and reflexive approaches to implementing gender. It provides operational support to implement gender both in terms of decision-making and resource allocation. The use of gender budgeting at all levels within the national context and use of gender assessments, although not consistent, provides an enhanced level of capacity to 'do' gender. This is reflected in the applied nature of the Gender Toolkits to assist specific interventions with partners.

### **3.6. Discussion of gender and climate policy frameworks and strategies**

The assessment of country policies and strategies on climate, development, and gender in the respective Nordic countries finds a lack of consistency in the application of gender in climate-related activities. The review reveals that there is insufficient information to establish consistency in gender equality mainstreaming actions. This inconsistency is also reflected in the projects assessed in Chapter 6.

Generally, the climate and development policies assessed fail to reflect a gender transformative approach that addresses the root causes of systemic gender biases. Additionally, a lacklustre commitment to integrating gender has been found, as gender is frequently mentioned across policy documents without clarifying details or committing to specific gender-related goals or initiatives within climate action. It is clear across the development policies, strategies and framework of the four Nordic countries that they regard gender equality as a fundamental value. Although this is a great starting point, this commitment to gender equality is not properly reflected in the actual initiatives, targets and indicators throughout the reviewed documents and despite offering detail in terms of climate change initiatives, women are only referred to a very limited extent.

Furthermore, gender was poorly integrated throughout climate ambitions, and when referencing women it was often in reference to SRHR. SRHR is extremely relevant, but it can also negate women as a means to an end in curbing population growth. The selective inclusion of a gender perspective seen in Nordic policies and strategies may work to perpetuate harmful gendered roles or stereotypes. It is imperative to understand that data and narratives often tend to mask unequal power relations. This absence of questioning existing norms or presentations of women reproduces institutional culture and perpetuates gender biases, instead of bringing forward transformative change (Dankelman & Jansen, 2010; Magnusdottir & Kronsell, 2015). The emancipation of women to enable their full political and economic

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<sup>30</sup> [Utgiftsområde 7 Internationellt bistånd](#)

<sup>31</sup> [Inriktning för det fortsatta arbetet med jämställdhetsintegrering för åren 2022–2025](#)

<sup>32</sup> [Sida's Gender Toolbox](#)

<sup>33</sup> [Sida's Gender equality, environment and climate change](#)

participation, as is brought forth in a few strategies, is a relevant tool but this will have to support women as agents of change and not simply as vulnerable beneficiaries or resources.

A further general observation amongst all the assessed policies is that the language and narratives are gender sensitive at the basic level or minimum compliance levels where practical gender needs and stereotypes of women and men are mentioned. None of the policies strongly embrace an intersectional approach to avoid gender binaries or improve gender inclusion. One of the reasons for gender integration in policies and strategies is the need to focus on individuals and groups who suffer societal discriminations resulting in their exclusion, isolation or restrictions due to their gender identities that are potentially exacerbated when dealing with climate impacts.

The policy assessments have demonstrated gaps in terms of gender integration in climate-related objectives where a focus is put on gender and climate as cross-cutting or mainstreaming efforts. While the two issues are focus areas for the Nordic countries, it remains difficult to find meaningful examples of the integration of gender in climate change policies as well as climate perspectives in gender policies. Although the intention of having gender and climate as cross-cutting commitments shows a basic understanding of the inter-linkages around these issues, the cross-cutting aspect risks becoming a tick-box exercise if it is not made clear how the nexus will be addressed, with indicators and mechanisms of implementation and monitoring. This has been further explored in the qualitative assessment of the selected projects and programmes (see Chapter 6).

The risk of responding to gender and climate as two cross-cutting issues demonstrates an underlying assumption that having committed to gender mainstreaming will lead to gender sensitive climate initiatives by default. It remains that none of the Nordic countries have a climate policy that challenges socio-economic outcomes that co-exist with structural barriers and discriminatory gender norms. This increases the risk that cross-cutting approaches may gloss over gender concerns. To ‘cross-mainstream’ gender and climate properly remains a challenge and integrating both in all policy areas, including the specific integration of gender in climate policies, is of high importance. There is a clear gap in translation of rhetoric to action.

Upon investigation, the assessment finds that “gender” is regularly used as a buzzword, linked to women only without making the step of questioning gendered norms or stereotypical understandings of femininity and masculinity. Thus “doing gender” is more about gender accommodating where gender differentials are merely acknowledged or used as examples. This creates systemic disconnections to the social ecological interactions and perpetuates systemic discriminations.

Finally, the reliance on the government of the day to ensure the space for advancing gender mainstreaming is not optimal, as the discrepancies in gender mainstreaming remain persistent. This is further exacerbated when Nordic countries take gender equality as a given and therefore neglect its effective implementation. The continued political blurring of gender practices and approaches reproduces a situation where gender mainstreaming efforts are weakened and the gap between rhetoric and action needs to be addressed.

## 4. Climate finance committed by the Nordic countries

This chapter provides an overview of the climate-related development finance commitments of the Nordic countries in the period 2012-2021, as reported to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), as well as the commitments reported to the European Commission for 2021 and 2022. The chapter then compares the grant equivalent climate finance values in the context of gross national income (GNI) and population for the four Nordic countries as well as relative to other members of OECD's DAC.

### 4.1. Methodology

To calculate the total amount of climate-related development finance committed by the Nordic countries, this report utilises project-level commitment data available in the climate-related development finance dataset of the OECD's CRS for the years 2012-2021 (OECD, 2023b). Additional sources used are specified in the relevant sections of the report.

The OECD dataset includes both concessional grants and loans and non-concessional flows i.e., both official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows (OOF). The analysis in this report is based only on concessional flows, recognising the definition of ODA by the OECD (OECD, n.d.-c).

For each activity or project, the dataset includes donor-reported information on the type of financial instrument (grants, loans), channel of delivery and the sector targeted, as well as Rio Markers for climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation which identify whether the reported development assistance targets these objectives. The Rio Markers defined by OECD operate on a three-tier scoring system where a score of principal (2) is assigned when the objective is fundamental in the design or motivation of the project, a score of significant (1) is assigned when the objective is important but not the fundamental driver or motivation, and not targeted (0) is assigned when a project is found not to target climate change in any significant way. A blank value implies that the activity has not been screened.

Depending on the Rio Marker assigned, a percentage of the overall budget of the project can be considered relevant to climate change mitigation and/or adaptation. By applying the Rio Marker accounting methodology (see Annex B.1.2), it is therefore possible to calculate the approximate amount of development finance committed by each of the Nordic countries that targets climate.<sup>34</sup>

**Rio Markers:** Every project/programme reported to DAC should be screened and marked as either (i) targeting the Rio Conventions as a “principal objective” (marker = 2) or a “significant objective” (marker =1), or (ii) not targeting the objective (marker = 0). The Rio markers can be applied to projects having objectives on: 1) biodiversity, 2) climate change mitigation, 3) climate change adaptation and 4) desertification.

Furthermore, using the OECD dataset it is possible to calculate the grant equivalent of loans to provide a clearer picture of the total net flow of climate finance from the Nordic countries. The grant equivalent estimates, at today's value, how much is given away in a financial transaction compared to a transaction at market terms. For example, grants have a grant element of 100% while a loan at market terms has a grant element of 0% (OECD, 2021). Grant equivalent figures thus better reflect the actual efforts by donor countries and the net benefit to developing countries as they distinguish between finance provided by grants and finance provided by loans with varying levels of generosity (see Annex B.1.3 for a full description of the methodology).


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<sup>34</sup> The assumed coefficient for projects marked with a Rio marker of “1” is 40% for all climate finance analysed in this study, in line with the most common methodology used in the Nordic countries (by both Norway and Sweden), as well as increasingly around the world (used by EU institutions and recommended by the OECD).



## 4.2. Nordic climate finance reported to the OECD-DAC

The Nordic countries have collectively reported a total of approximately 20.9 billion USD in climate-related development finance over the period 2012-2021 to the OECD-DAC CRS, of which 14.9 billion (72%) is climate-specific finance (i.e., bilateral and donor contributions to multilateral organisations earmarked for specific purposes) and 6.0 billion (28%) is core contributions to multilateral organisations (imputed multilateral contributions). Of the 14.9 billion in climate-specific finance, 12.7 billion is concessional grants and loans and 2.2 billion is not concessional. A full breakdown of climate-related development finance provided by the Nordic countries is provided in Annex A.



**Figure 4:** Total grants and concessional loans reported by the Nordic countries to the OECD-DAC CRS over the period 2012-2021. Figures include climate-specific finance (i.e., bilateral and donor contributions to multilateral organisations earmarked for specific purposes) and core contributions to multilateral institutions (imputed multilateral contributions).

Figure 4 shows the total grants and concessional loans reported by the Nordic countries to the OECD-DAC CRS over the period 2012-2021, including both climate-specific finance and imputed multilateral contributions. The amount committed varies over the years due to changes in budget allocations and political priorities:

**Denmark:** The total amount of grants and concessional loans reported by Denmark in the period is 2859 million USD. There has been a general increase in the amount committed yearly, with a high of 480 million USD in 2021 compared to a low of 143 million USD in 2016.

**Finland:** Finland reported the lowest total amount of grants and concessional loans across the period among the Nordic countries, at 1450 million USD. This reached a high of 301 million USD in 2017 but there has been significant variation in the amounts reported, with just 42 million USD in 2016.

**Norway:** In absolute terms, Norway reported the highest total amount of grants and concessional loans over the 10-year period with commitments totalling 7326 million USD. There has, however, been variation across the years. After reporting a relatively low commitment in 2019 of 581 million, Norway reported 728 million USD in 2021.

**Sweden:** Sweden reported a total of 7045 million USD in grants and concessional loans across the period. This peaked at 1253 million USD in 2020 but fell to low 685 million USD in 2021.

### 4.3. Nordic climate finance reported to the European Commission

The European Union Member States are required to submit annual reports to the European Commission under the Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action (GR), including information on financial and technical support to developing countries (European Parliament, 2018). Thus, as well as recalculating climate finance totals through the CRS dataset, it is also possible to explore what donors are reporting to the EU GR. The climate finance commitments of Sweden, Denmark and Finland as reported under the GR for 2021 and 2022 are provided in Table 2. Norway is not a member of the EU, so disbursement data is retrieved from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) (Norad, 2023).

	Total climate finance (USD)		Per capita total climate finance (USD)	
	2021	2022	2021	2022
<b>Denmark</b>	456,701,037	278,289,837	78	47
<b>Finland</b>	173,282,430	209,079,488	31	38
<b>Norway</b>	558,789,290	717,690,883	103	131
<b>Sweden</b>	805,626,919	836,839,961	77	80

**Table 2:** Total climate-specific concessional finance commitments of the Nordic countries in 2021. Figures exclude core contributions to multilateral institutions. The figures for Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are commitments and retrieved from the two latest GR submissions to the EU (European Union, n.d.). For projects marked with a Rio marker of “significant” in this reporting, the Rio Marker coefficients used are 40% for Sweden and 50% for Denmark. Finland uses a range of coefficients on a case-by-case basis. The figures for Denmark, Finland and Sweden have been converted into dollars from national currencies with OECD average conversion rates for 2021 and 2022 (OECD, 2023c). Norway does not report support to developing countries to the EU, so Norway figures are retrieved from Norad (Norad, 2023). Additionally, Norway does not provide commitments, so in contrast to the other countries' figures, the Norwegian climate finance figures are given as disbursements. The figures for Norway are stated with the conversion used in the Norad dataset. For projects marked with a Rio marker of “significant” in this reporting, Norway uses a Rio marker coefficient of 40%. Population sourced from the OECD.Stat database (OECD, n.d.-b)

When looking at Table 2, it is important to note that Sweden, Finland and Denmark have followed the EU GR guidelines and that the methodologies used in reporting to the EU may be different to those used in reporting to the OECD-CRS dataset (used to produce Figure 4). Denmark, for example, includes granular calculations for FFU Windows, CISU Pool Schemes and Strategic Partnership Organisations in reporting to the EU GR, but reports these with Rio markers to the OECD CRS. Furthermore, in reporting projects marked with a Rio marker of ‘significant’ to the EU, Norway and Sweden use a Rio Marker coefficient of 40%, Denmark uses 50% and Finland uses a range of coefficients on a case-by-case basis, while in this study a standard coefficient of 40% has been applied. Due to the granular methodology used by Finland, they report considerably lower climate finance to the EU GR compared to the OECD-CRS.

### 4.4. Climate finance efforts of the Nordic countries

In this section, the Nordic countries’ climate finance commitments are contextualised in light of their respective populations and in relation to their allocations of climate finance as a percentage of each country's GNI, for the year 2021. The two proxy indicators - economy and population size - provide indication of effort according to respective capabilities. For the GNI indicator, the analysis also compares the Nordic countries to the other OECD-DAC member countries. This approach gives an overview of current contributions which is inspired by similar calculations produced around reported figures of ODA. The agreed UN target for ODA states that developed countries should devote 0.7% of GNI to ODA, however, there is no agreed GNI target for climate finance allocations for each donor country.

To account for the difference in the use of grants and concessional loans by the OECD-DAC member countries and to facilitate comparison, this section estimates the ‘grant equivalent’ value of climate finance

commitments. Developed country donors can report climate finances provided not only using grants, but also finance delivered using concessional loans and other non-grant financial instruments, such as equity investments. As such, some countries, such as France, report a large volume of loans at their face value. The reporting of non-grant finance at its face value means that the reported figures include a portion of the finance which will be returned to them and can therefore be considered a somewhat inaccurate estimate of their actual financial effort towards UNFCCC targets. By including only the estimated grant equivalent value of concessional non-grant finance, grant equivalent amounts better estimate the financial effort of each donor, showing which donors rely more heavily on loans and providing an idea of the favourability of those loans for developing country recipients.<sup>35</sup>

The concessionality of non-grant development finance is determined through a ‘grant element’ calculation, the value of which (a percentage) is dependent on the conditions of the extended non-grant finance including the loan’s interest rate, grace period, maturity, and discount rate. Only sufficiently favourable conditions will result in large grant element percentages. By multiplying the face-value amount of development finance by the grant element percentage, the grant equivalent value can be determined (see Annex B.1.3 for further details).

The Nordic countries provide most of climate-specific finance as grants (and a small amount of equity and shares in collective investment vehicles that is provided by Finland). A small amount of the imputed multilateral contributions committed by Finland are reported as delivered by concessional loans, thus there is a small difference in the grant equivalent climate finance and face value climate finance reported by Finland. For all other Nordic countries, the grant equivalent values are equal to the face value reported figures. The grant equivalent figures are, however, important for those countries extending large amounts of climate finance as loans. By calculating the grant equivalent value of the climate finance provided by, for example, Germany, France, or Spain, it becomes clear that the grant equivalent value of their climate finance totals are significantly lower than their official face value figures.

#### **4.4.1. Nordic climate finance according to population and GNI**

Taking the climate finance commitments of the Nordic countries according to population and as a share GNI provides an indication of effort relative to size and wealth. As shown in Table 3, there is a large difference in the per capita commitments of climate finance by the Nordic countries. Sweden commits a high absolute value of climate finance but given its large population it has a relatively low climate finance commitment per capita. Norway has the largest climate finance per capita, while Finland has both the lowest absolute commitment in 2021 and the lowest per capita commitment.

Figure 5 shows the amount of climate finance which has been provided by the Nordic countries on top of the long-standing international commitment made by rich countries to provide 0.7 percent of their GNI as ODA. This highlights the extent to which climate finance is ‘new and additional’<sup>36</sup> to development support, rather than simply ODA rebadged with climate objectives in light of concern that climate finance is in some cases competing with, and potentially displacing, finances targeting other developmental objectives. Norway and Sweden surpass considerably the commitment to provide 0.7 percent of their GNI as ODA, so their climate finance can be considered ‘new and additional’. However, Denmark surpasses the commitment only slightly, and thus almost none of the reported climate finance can be considered ‘new and additional’ to ODA. Finland falls significantly short of the 0.7 target and thus none of the climate finance provided can be considered additional to ODA.

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<sup>35</sup> The analysis in this report is based only on concessional flows and non-concessional flows have been excluded from the analysis, recognising the definition of ODA by the OECD (OECD, n.d.-c). For non-concessional loans the grant element is calculated as 0%.

<sup>36</sup> An assessment of whether the public climate finance reported by 23 rich countries with obligations under the UNFCCC is new and additional to their support for development is provided in Hattle & Nordbo (2022).



	Population (million people)	GNI (USD millions)	Face value climate finance (USD millions)	Grant equivalent value of reported climate finance (USD millions)	Grant equivalent climate finance per capita (USD)	Grant equivalent climate finance as share of GNI (%)
Denmark	5.87	410,960	480	480	82	0.12%
Finland	5.54	304,183	301	275	50	0.09%
Norway	5.43	504,529	728	728	134	0.14%
Sweden	10.45	654,435	685	685	66	0.10%

**Table 3:** Comparing climate finance for the Nordic countries according to population and share of GNI. Data presented for commitments in the year 2021. Includes climate-specific finance (i.e., bilateral and donor contributions to multilateral organisations earmarked for specific purposes) and core contributions to multilateral institutions (imputed multilateral contributions). Figures based on concessional finance only. Population and GNI sourced from the OECD.Stat database (OECD, n.d.-b). Grant equivalent finance derived from the OECD-DAC CRS (OECD, 2023b). A coefficient of for 40% is applied to all projects marked with a Rio marker of “significant”.





Figure 5: ODA contributions of the Nordic countries and amount of (grant equivalent) climate finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI. Includes climate-specific finance (i.e., bilateral and donor contributions to multilateral organisations earmarked for specific purposes) and core contributions to multilateral institutions (imputed multilateral contributions). Data presented for 2021. Grant equivalent finance derived from the OECD-DAC CRS (OECD, 2023b). ODA and GNI sourced from the OECD.Stat database (OECD, n.d.-b).


#### 4.4.2. Nordic climate finance relative to the OECD-DAC member countries

Figure 6 displays climate-related development finance as a share of GNI for the Nordic countries alongside the other DAC member countries. It shows that relative to the other DAC members, the Nordic countries commit a relatively high share of their gross national income to climate finance. Norway, Denmark, and Sweden are the top contributors according to this metric, followed by France and Japan who both committed approximately 0.10%. Finland falls slightly behind with a share of 0.09%. Only four other countries provided above 0.05% of their GNI as climate finance – German, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium.



**Figure 6:** Ranking of the DAC countries according to grant equivalent of climate finance compared to GNI. Data displayed for 2021. Grant equivalent finance derived from the OECD-DAC CRS (OECD, 2023b). GNI sourced from the OECD.Stat database (OECD, n.d.-b).

ODA (inclusive of climate finance) as a share of gross national income is provided in Figure 7. Denmark, Norway and Sweden are three of only five developed countries that fulfill the UN goal of contributing a minimum 0.7 percent of GNI as ODA, alongside Luxembourg and Germany.



**Figure 7:** Ranking of DAC countries according to ODA compared to GNI. Data displayed for 2021. ODA and GNI sourced from the OECD.Stat database (OECD, n.d.-b).

## 5. Gender integration in Nordic climate finance

Having established the amount of climate-related development finance committed by the Nordic countries across the period of this study, this chapter aims to understand the degree to which gender is integrated in the Nordic countries' climate finance programmes. First, Section 5.1 assesses Nordic reporting on gender integration in climate finance to the UNFCCC, through the Biennial Reports (BRs) and biennial communications to Article 9.5. Following this, Section 5.2 presents an overview of the level of gender integration in Nordic climate finance using the OECD-DAC CRS dataset. This includes analysis of the distribution of gender equality objectives between adaptation, mitigation, and cross-cutting projects, as well as an analysis of the relative levels of gender integration across different sectors, recipients, and implementation channels.

### 5.1. Methodology

To assess Nordic reporting on gender integration in climate finance to the UNFCCC (Section 5.2) the Fifth Biennial Reports and most recent Biennial Communications to Article 9.5 are reviewed for references to gender equality and gender responsiveness.

To analyse the level of gender integration in climate-related development finance provided by the Nordic countries (Section 5.3) this report utilises project-level commitment data available in the climate-related development finance dataset of the OECD's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) for the years 2012-2021 (OECD, 2023b) building on the methodology outlined in Section 4.1.

In addition to the Rio Markers, when reporting to the OECD-DAC donors are also requested to assess the extent to which their bilateral ODA addresses gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls through the gender equality policy marker (GEM). The GEM is based on activities at the planning and design phase, and states that an activity should be classified as addressing gender equality if *"it is intended to advance gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls or reduce discrimination and inequalities based on sex"* (OECD, 2023a, p. 95).

Utilising the gender markers, it is possible to estimate and analyse the flows of climate-related development finance that target gender equality as a policy objective. The data collected through the marker facilitates comparison, can increase understanding of gender integration in development finance, and inform policy discussion around gender equality.

Use of the GEM for analysis in this way comes with limitations. First and foremost, the gender markers may not always have been applied accurately and thus truly reflect the level of gender integration in the project. The OECD marking guidelines can be interpreted differently and applied inconsistently, and some DAC members have noted difficulties in determining the score of activities (OECD, 2023a). It is also likely that the quality of application of the gender markers has improved over time as reporting countries become more familiar with the process. Furthermore, the gender marker is a qualitative instrument and thus provides an *estimate* of finance in support of gender equality and an indication of broad trends, rather than an exact quantitative calculation.

**Gender Equality Markers:** Every project/programme reported to DAC should be screened and marked as either (i) targeting gender equality as a "principal objective" (marker = 2) or a "significant objective" (marker =1), or (ii) not targeting the objective (marker = 0). The gender equality marker should be applied to all Official Development Assistance.

## 5.2. Gender integration in Nordic climate finance reported to the UNFCCC

### 5.2.1. Fifth Biennial Reports (BR5)

The Paris Agreement requires Parties to report on a number of elements in tracking and achieving the goals of the convention. Annex II countries<sup>37</sup> must periodically submit BRs to the UNFCCC Secretariat to provide information on progress in reducing emissions and the provision of financial, technology and capacity-building support to non-Annex I Parties. The BRs include a narrative report and data report submitted in the common tabular format (CTF). Parties provide ex-post reports on climate finance through the chapter “Provision of financial, technological and capacity building support to developing country Parties”, as well as Tables 7, 7(a) and 7(b) of the CTF (UNFCCC, 2013). Parties are also requested to submit ex-ante reports, which cover projections of future climate finance in the Biennial Communications to Article 9.5 (see Section 5.2.2).

The UNFCCC biennial report tables for climate finance do not have a specific space for including gender information, however there is room to voluntarily provide this information and Sweden have elected to report the proportion of their overall climate finance which has an associated gender equality marker of significant or principal i.e., has gender integrated according to OECD standards (OECD-DAC GENDERNET, 2016). Of the Nordic countries, Sweden is the only party to have taken this step. Furthermore, the reporting of gender integration in climate finance in the narrative reports of the BRs remains limited:

**Denmark:** In the BR4, Denmark mentions that SDG5 for Gender Equality is one of the five priority SDGs targeted by its development cooperation strategy “The World 2030” and also gives examples of certain activities which have gender equality as a key objective, such as the Danish contribution to SEforALL (Denmark Ministry of Climate Energy and Utilities, 2019). The BR5 for Denmark includes further project overviews, a few of which include references to gender in the objectives or project description (Denmark Ministry of Climate Energy and Utilities, 2023).

**Finland:** Similar to reporting in the BR4, in the BR5 Finland notes gender equality as an objective that is promoted through its development policy alongside climate resilience and low emission development (Finland Ministry of the Environment, 2022).

**Sweden:** In both the BR4 and BR5, Sweden makes clear the importance of gender justice to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and notes a commitment to integrating gender equality throughout its development cooperation including in climate finance. They further report that Sweden’s position on the boards of multilateral climate funds has allowed them to champion gender policies and action plans (Sweden Ministry of Climate and Enterprise, 2001).

The level of gender integration reported by Sweden for bilateral climate finance has fallen slightly year on year, though nonetheless remains high (see Table 4). The largest decrease is seen from 2019 to 2020 and is attributed to quality assurance of data (Sweden Ministry of Climate and Enterprise, 2023).

Sweden states that the reason for reporting the level of gender integration in its climate finance information is three-fold; for tracking purposes, to encourage further gender integration, and to inspire other actors to do likewise (Sweden Ministry of Climate and Enterprise, 2023).

**Norway:** Norway makes no reference to gender equality considerations as part of its BR4 or BR5 reporting on climate finance (Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2020, 2022).

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<sup>37</sup> Annex II countries are required to provide financial resources to developing countries to enable them to undertake emissions reductions activities and adapt to the adverse effects of climate change.

	2017		2018		2019		2020	
Type of support	Climate finance (mSEK)	Of which gender integrated (%)	Climate finance (mSEK)	Of which gender integrated (%)	Climate finance (mSEK)	Of which gender integrated (%)	Climate finance (mSEK)	Of which gender integrated (%)
<b>Mitigation</b>	689	80%	1,012	80%	1,091	78%	968	71%
<b>Adaptation</b>	1,329	94%	2,099	88%	2,041	85%	1,600	83%
<b>Cross-cutting</b>	1,203	88%	1,234	91%	1,521	89%	14,25	81%
<b>Total</b>	3,222	89%	4,345	87%	4,653	85%	3,993	79%

**Table 4:** The reported level of Gender Integration in Swedish bilateral climate finance the years 2017-2020. 2017 and 2018 data is sourced from Sweden’s MMR for 2017 (Einoet, n.d.-a) and 2018 (Einoet, n.d.-b). 2019 and 2020 data is sourced from Sweden’s BR5 (Sweden Ministry of Climate and Enterprise, 2023).

## 5.2.2. Biennial Communications to Article 9.5

In addition to ex-post reporting of climate finance information in the BRs, developed country parties to the Paris Agreement are required to report on their projected climate finance provisions for the future in Biennial Communications to Article 9.5. The overall goal of these submissions is to improve predictability, efficiency, and clarity on support to be provided in line with the financial provisions of the Paris Agreement. Unlike in the ex-post reporting of the BRs, the Biennial Communications have a specific chapter assigned to “*Information on policies and priorities, including regions and geography, recipient countries, beneficiaries, targeted groups, sectors and gender responsiveness*” (UNFCCC, 2023a). This paves the way for submissions to outline how and to what degree their climate finance will be gender responsive in the coming years.

Denmark, Finland, and Sweden report jointly under the auspices of the European Union, while Norway reports individually. The joint EU submission notes that gender sensitivity – promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment - is a “*typically important criteria*” in project selection (European Commission, 2022, p. 14). All Nordic countries mention gender as a consideration or objective for their climate finance but largely fail to provide further details of this:

**Denmark:** Gender equality is referred to as a cross-cutting priority in climate-related development, and is clearly outlined in broader development policy, but the submission lacks explicit details concerning gender responsive climate finance. Denmark states that “*All activities should contribute to the fight for equality, girls’ and women’s rights, because equality and women’s economic and political empowerment contribute to more equal, democratic and sustainable societies.*” (European Commission, 2022, p.68)

**Finland:** Gender equality is referred to as both a long-standing component, and an established cross-cutting component, of the Finnish development strategy (European Commission, 2022).

**Sweden:** The biennial communication states: “In 2021, approximately 81 percent of the Swedish bilateral climate finance was considered gender integrated.” (European Commission, 2022, p. 215). Sweden has provided little qualitative information on the gender-responsiveness of its future support and unlike in its first biennial communication, the submission does not refer to the role of feminist foreign policy in ensuring gender-responsive support, as the policy has not been adopted under the new government. No recipients or income groups are explicitly referred to in the context of Sweden’s future climate finance, and no enhanced, indicative information has been provided at the project level. As a result, no quantitative information has been provided showing how climate finances will respond to the needs of the most vulnerable.


**Norway:** The submission states: “Gender, human rights, anti-corruption and climate and environment are cross cutting issues that have to be taken into account in all Norwegian ODA” yet provides no further detail regarding gender-responsive finance in its future climate support, or quantitative evidence of its integration (Norway, 2023, p. 4).

## 5.3. Gender integration in Nordic climate finance reported to the OECD-DAC


### 5.3.1. Gender integration in climate finance across the Nordics

Gender equality markers are mandatory when reporting ODA to the OECD and voluntary for non-concessional finance. Indeed, only small amounts of the climate-specific grants and concessional loans reported by the Nordic countries to the OECD-DAC is not screened for gender (indicated where the field has been left blank in the OECD database), as shown Figure 8. All the non-concessional climate-specific finance reported by the Nordic countries, on the other hand, was reported as not screened for gender in all years. The majority of this is committed by Norway. As such, non-concessional finance is removed from the analysis in the following sections of this study to include only concessional, climate-specific finance.

The Nordic countries should be commended for the level of coverage they have in screening for gender equality. They all apply gender markers to their climate-related ODA with only a few minor exceptions which are left blank. This provides important transparency on the subject. While non-concessional flows are often not reported as climate finance to the UNFCCC in the Nordic Countries' BRs (in the cases of Denmark and Finland), the voluntary gender screening of OOF would be welcomed to provide further transparency on gender integration in all international finance flows and would enhance the Nordics' position as leaders on gender and transparency.



**Figure 8:** Gender markers assigned to the climate-specific finance committed by the Nordic countries (combined) in the period 2018-2021. All figures millions USD.



**Figure 9:** Share of gender integration (% with a gender equality marker of 1 or 2) in the Nordic countries' climate-specific grants and concessional loans.

Figure 9 shows the change in gender integration (i.e., finance with a GEM of principal or significant) in the Nordic countries' climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed over the 10-year period of the study. For all Nordic countries combined, the level of gender integration showed a general increase from 38% in 2012 to 51% in 2019 but has since declined to around 40%. This means that approximately 60% of finance committed by the Nordic countries in the last two years does not consider gender as a policy objective. Even at the peak of 56% in 2018, these figures remain too low to consider Nordic climate-finance to be truly gender responsive.


It is also important to consider the share of climate finance that integrates gender equality as a principal objective. The share of finance assigned a gender marker of principal has decreased on average for the Nordics, as shown in Figure 10. In 2018, 9% of the Nordic countries' climate-specific grants and concessional loans was assigned a gender marker of principal. This subsequently dropped to 2% in all proceeding years. For comparison, the *Oxfam Climate Finance Shadow Report* found that 51% of climate-specific finance provided by bilateral donors in 2019-2020 was gender integrated, 49% with a gender equality marker of significant and 2% with a gender marker of principal (Zagema et al., 2023).

A full breakdown of the gender markers assigned to Nordic climate finance in the period 2012-2021 is provided in Annex X.

The Nordic countries have a diverse range of thematic areas and goals related to their climate-related development finance (see Chapter 3 for a description of the gender policy architecture in each of the countries). This is partly a result of the presence of a fragmented global climate finance regime, and it should therefore not be expected that all countries provide the same balance of climate finance across different objectives, sectors, implementing channels etc. (Skovgaard, 2017). There is a clear difference in the success of the Nordics in their record on integrating gender in climate finance (see figures 11-14).



## All Nordics



**Figure 10:** Gender markers assigned to the climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by the Nordic countries (combined) in the period 2012-2021.


**Denmark:** Gender integration in Danish climate-specific grants and concessional loans decreased year-on-year from 2015 to 2020 from a peak of 84% in 2015 to a low of 38% in 2020. This recovered only somewhat to 48% in 2021. Denmark had been above or approximately equivalent to the Nordic average in all years until 2019 and 2020. The proportion of finance with a gender marker of principal has been extremely low across all years (see figure 11).

**Finland:** Gender integration in Finnish climate-specific grants and concessional loans peaked at 84% in 2017, but subsequently fell to 46% in 2019 and 47% in 2020. In 2021, gender integration in Finnish climate-specific concessional finance rose to 64%. The level of gender integration remained above the Nordic average in all years except 2019. In 2018, 9% of climate finance was assigned a gender marker of principal, though in other years this has been as low as 0% (see figure 12).

**Norway:** In all years the reported gender integration in Norwegian climate finance is significantly lower than the Nordic average. However, in recent years the levels of gender integration have increased slightly, from a low of 4% in 2017 to 23% in 2020 and 19% in 2021. The share of finance with a gender marker of principal is also low – most years see a proportion of 0% and the peak is just 3% in 2020 (see figure 13).


**Sweden:** The level of gender integration in Swedish finance has remained consistently above the Nordic average in all years, having increased sharply in 2014 with the introduction of a feminist foreign policy. It has, however, fallen somewhat in recent years from a high of 93% in 2017 to 72% in 2021. When considering the climate finance assigned a principal gender marker, Sweden reports the highest amount of the Nordic countries, but this has also decreased significantly from a peak of 26% in 2017 to just 1% in 2020 and 5% in 2021 (see figure 14).

## Denmark




**Figure 11:** Gender markers assigned to the climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by Denmark in the period 2012-2021.


## Finland



**Figure 12:** Gender markers assigned to the climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by Finland in the period 2012-2021.



**Figure 13:** Gender markers assigned to the climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by Norway in the period 2012-2021.



**Figure 14:** Gender markers assigned to the climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by Sweden in the period 2012-2021.

It is important to note that a situation where all climate projects/programmes have a principal gender marker is not the stated aim, and that projects marked with a principal gender marker are not by definition better than projects with a significant gender marker. Climate finance often has other primary and significant objectives, as indicated by the Rio marker score, and as such demanding that standalone gender projects make up the majority of climate finance may distract from and diminish the other outcomes (i.e., climate mitigation or adaptation objectives). If donors aim to systematically mainstream gender in their climate commitments, it can be expected that a gender marker of significant will be assigned to a large proportion of climate finance, as is seen in the case of Sweden. The OECD-DAC Network on Gender Equality recommends that “donors adopt a twin-track approach to gender equality across their development co-operation portfolio, combining dedicated/ targeted interventions (usually score 2) with gender mainstreaming (usually score 1). If gender mainstreaming is systematically practised, gender equality will often be a significant objective of projects across the whole range of sectors.” (OECD-DAC GENDERNET, 2016, pg. 16).

### 5.3.2. Gender integration in climate-related ODA and all bilateral ODA

Comparing the average level of gender integration in Nordic climate-related development finance to the level of gender integration in all bilateral development finance commitments (inclusive of climate-related), there is a mixed picture across the four countries (see Table 5):

**Denmark:** Denmark has marginally higher levels of integration in climate-related finance than development finance overall, except in 2020 when this was one point lower.

**Finland:** Finland has generally reported lower levels of gender integration in climate-related finance except for in 2020 when this was 10 points higher.

**Norway:** Norway, on the other hand, reports significantly lower levels of gender integration in its climate-related finance in all years – in 2021, gender integration in Norwegian climate-related finance was less than half of that in the overall development finance.

**Sweden:** Sweden reports higher levels of gender integration in climate-related finance than overall development in all years.

		Gender integration in climate-related bilateral ODA	Gender integration in bilateral ODA
<b>Denmark</b>	2019	47%	43%
	2020	38%	39%
	2021	48%	39%
<b>Finland</b>	2019	46%	58%
	2020	47%	37%
	2021	64%	69%
<b>Norway</b>	2019	16%	40%
	2020	23%	47%
	2021	19%	40%
<b>Sweden</b>	2019	81%	79%
	2020	81%	68%
	2021	72%	68%

**Table 5:** Level of gender integration (% with a GEM of principal or significant) in Nordic climate-specific grants and concessional loans and all bilateral ODA (inclusive of climate-related bilateral ODA) in the years 2019, 2020 and 2021.

### 5.3.3. Gender integration across objectives

Under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, climate finance should be balanced between mitigation and adaptation objectives (UNFCCC, 2015a). However, the current consensus is that there is a large discrepancy between the amount of finance committed to the two and that despite accelerating climate risks, adaptation financing needs and costs are now approximately 10-18 times as great as total international public adaptation finance flows (UNEP, 2023). The balance of climate finance also has gender implications, as sectors such as energy which are often the primary focus of mitigation finance tend to be traditionally male dominated.

The balance in mitigation and adaptation objectives targeted by the climate-specific grants and concessional loans provided by the Nordic varies between the countries and across years:

**Denmark:** Of the Nordic countries, Denmark shows relatively more balance between objectives. However, in recent years the proportion of mitigation finance has risen, reaching 55% in 2021 compared to 32% in 2018.

**Finland:** The balance in objectives has varied for the climate finance committed by Finland, with a preference for mitigation finance in both 2021 and 2020 but more equal distribution in 2019 and 2018.

**Norway:** The climate finance committed by Norway is significantly skewed toward mitigation objectives. In both 2021 and 2020, for example, mitigation finance accounted for 76% of climate finance.

**Sweden:** Sweden commits relatively more finance to adaptation and cross-cutting projects, with mitigation finance accounting for just 21% and 18% of climate finance in 2021 and 2020 respectively.


It is noted that Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative's (NICFI) projects are overwhelmingly reported with mitigation as their principal objective, whilst they can often include adaptation/cross-cutting components that aren't entirely captured in climate finance statistics (Dejgaard & Hattle, 2020). Likewise, in the case of Finland, a large share of finance is channelled through multilateral organisations, many of whom focus on adaptation and cross-cutting objectives. For example, in 2017, Finland reported 440 million USD in disbursed core-funding to 'other' specialized United Nations bodies (Finnish Ministry of the Environment, 2019).

Nonetheless, while the OECD-CRS dataset may not provide a comprehensive analysis of the balance of Nordic mitigation and adaptation finance, it can be used to analyse whether there is a greater concentration of gender equality markers in one of the objectives compared to the other.


Across the years and countries, there is a higher level of gender integration in the climate-specific concessional finance that targets adaptation and cross-cutting objectives compared to finance that targets mitigation objectives, as shown in Figure 15. In 2021, for example, combining all Nordic countries we find that 61% of adaptation finance and 60% of cross-cutting finance had a gender marker of either significant or principal, compared to just 29% of mitigation finance. There was, however, a significant drop in the level of gender integration in cross-cutting finance for all countries from 2018 to 2019, and the level remained low in 2020 and 2021.

While there is a very low proportion of finance reported with a principal gender equality marker across all objectives, it can also be seen that there are more principal gender equality markers in adaptation finance than mitigation finance across all years, as shown in Figure 15. In 2021, 3% of adaptation finance and 9% of cross-cutting finance had a gender marker of principal, compared to 0% of mitigation finance.

This trend is broadly in line with analysis of the bilateral allocable ODA of all OECD DAC members, which showed that while the share of ODA addressing climate change mitigation that also integrates gender equality objectives has increased, it remains low at 46% in 2018-2019. This is compared to 67% for adaptation programmes and programmes that target both mitigation and adaptation (OECD, 2022).



**Figure 15:** Gender markers assigned to the climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by the Nordic countries, broken down by objective. Data displayed for all Nordic countries combined.



**Figure 16:** Gender markers assigned to the climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by the Nordic countries, broken down by objective. **Data displayed for 2021.** The darkest shade of colour (e.g., dark blue for Finland) represents finance with a gender marker of principal while the lighter shade represents finance with a gender marker of significant. Light grey represents finance with a gender marker of zero, indicating that the finance has been screened and found not to target gender.

There are differences in the gender integration across objectives for the climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by each country, as shown across Figures 17-19:

**Denmark:** Denmark has higher levels of gender integration in adaptation and cross-cutting activities. In some years, gender integration in cross-cutting finance is particularly high (see Figure 18), though relatively low levels were reported in both 2019 and 2020 reflecting the decrease seen across the other Nordic countries. Denmark is, however, the only country for which integration in cross-cutting finance increased from 2020 to 2021, reaching 91%.

For adaptation finance, Denmark, with the exception of two anomalous years in 2013 and 2014, shows consistency around the 60% mark. The 2014 anomaly seen in Denmark's data is a result of no climate finance being marked adaptation without a corresponding mitigation Rio marker of the same value (i.e., there is a concentration of cross-cutting finance in this year). In connection with this, the 100% integration shown in 2013 by Denmark is as a result of a very low amount of adaptation finance being provided in that year, with the few adaptation projects happening to have gender mainstreamed in them (significant gender markers).

Denmark's mitigation finance oscillates around 40%, with a peak of 59% in 2013 and a low of 18% in 2017. After this low, the level of gender integration rebounded somewhat to 49% in 2019 but fell again to 27% in 2020 and 32% in 2021.

**Finland:** The variation in gender integration across objectives is less pronounced for Finland. The level of gender integration in Finnish adaptation finance has seen an overall decrease since 2015 when it reached a peak of above 90%, to just 45% in 2020 and 42% in 2021. Having started at relatively low levels in 2012, the level of gender integration in finance committed by Finland that targets cross-cutting objectives has risen to above 80% in 2017 and 2020.

Gender integration in Finnish mitigation finance dropped in earlier years to a low of 4% in 2014, which was followed by an increase up to a peak in 2017 of 84%, and then a significant decrease to 18% in 2019. The level of gender integration has subsequently increased year-on-year to 41% in 2020 and 80% in 2021.

**Norway:** Norway has higher levels of gender integration in adaptation finance and cross-cutting finance than mitigation finance. There has been a slight increase in the level of gender integration in mitigation finance, though this remains low.

In adaptation finance, Norway reported a peak in 2014 before a decrease in the level of gender integration year-on-year to a low of below 20% in 2018, followed by slight resurgence in subsequent years to 49% in 2021. Norwegian cross-cutting finance shows large variation across the years, but there are few projects which fall under this objective reported by Norway.

Gender integration in Norway's mitigation finance saw a relative high in 2013 at 15%, followed by a drop down to an average of approximately 2% in the years 2014-2018, and finally by an increase back to 16% and 18% in 2020 and 2021 respectively. In 2021, the level fell again to 10%. The very high proportion of mitigation finance provided by Norway, in comparison to their adaptation and cross-cutting finance, coupled with the dominant gender-neutral narratives in mitigation provides some explanation for the low levels of gender integration in their overall climate-related development finance. There was limited opportunity to explore if this is a result of hidden masculinities within institutional mechanisms and its influence over the narratives of climate action.

**Sweden:** Sweden exhibits the greatest consistency across objectives, maintaining high levels of gender integration across adaptation, cross-cutting and mitigation projects. Sweden shows a consistently high proportion of gender integration in adaptation finance though this for the first time fell below 80% in 2021. Sweden also reports a marked increase in its gender integration in cross-cutting projects in the year 2014 and largely retains this high proportion between 2014-2019. However, the level fell in 2020 and then again in 2021 to reach a low of 60%.

The level of gender integration in mitigation financing has remained relatively consistent for Sweden since starting at a relative low of 44% in 2012. Since 2014, the figure has remained above 80% with the exception of 2019 when the level was 70%. The 2014 increase follows the adoption of the Swedish feminist foreign policy in the same year.

Conceptually, adaptation and mitigation activities have different characteristics. Mitigation projects focus fundamentally on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as a global public good (Grasso, 2004). Emissions reduced through a mitigation project will have a positive impact around the world, beyond a local community or recipient community. Synergistic objectives, such as energy access or air quality which do benefit local communities, are therefore often secondary drivers and the criteria by which these projects are marked with mitigation Rio markers is based on reducing emissions. As such, mitigation projects do not often have local communities at the forefront of their motivation (there are notable exceptions including REDD+ projects and local energy access). This makes the idea of benefitting local peoples through gender transformative approaches a more difficult concept, as they are not (always) the primary target beneficiaries.


On the other hand, adaptation activities (and to a lesser extent cross cutting activities) more fundamentally target individuals, communities, regions, and countries. Projects tend to benefit people and or communities in a defined area (the exception being adaptation projects targeting natural systems). This means that gender can more fundamentally be integrated into the activities, outputs, and activities in an adaptation projects' results frame.

Most mitigation finance is also largely channelled to large, utility-scale projects in energy infrastructure, renewable energy or efficiency which are too often viewed as 'gender neutral' (CDKN Global, 2015). However, these projects can have gender differentiated impacts and many mitigation areas have the potential to support gender equality and empowerment while also delivering reduction of emissions. Energy access via renewables, for example, can be a means by which to address energy poverty and lack of access to clean energy which disproportionately affects women. Sectors tied to adaptation such as agriculture are a major employer of women globally (FAO, 2023), while women are underrepresented in the renewable energy sector, for example (World Economic Forum, 2016). There are also dominant narratives around gendered participation in sectors tied to the two objectives. That traditionally we see less women employed in the energy sector is in itself an opportunity for job creation and capacity building efforts that integrate gender. These activities can therefore provide important opportunities to improve livelihoods, health, well-being and empowerment.


In practicality, mitigation and adaptation projects are more complex than discussed here, but it is likely that the challenges which face those aiming to implement gender mainstreaming across the two objectives will be different. There is a reliance on project designers to mainstream gender across a range of sectors and different types of projects, some of which may not initially appear predisposed for gender mainstreaming. If capacity is not sufficient to adequately identify and understand the gender context and implications of the planned activities these projects risk amplifying gender inequalities. To achieve a sufficient degree of gender integration, development and implementing agencies must have capacity throughout their organisation to ensure context specific and effective actions are made across all sectors. Agencies must move past a focus on the 'low-hanging fruit', and target sectors with gaps in gender integration. Furthermore, decision-making structures and context analyses that go into these projects should also be gender sensitive. Inspiration can be taken from the Swedish *Energia* project (CRS ID 2018061548A), a 'best in class' mitigation project as discussed in Section 6.2.5.

Consultants recognise that there may indeed be certain projects that are not suitable for gender mainstreaming at all. However, this will depend on the type of project and these cases will be in a very small minority due to the prevalence of gender inequality across society. In general, more efforts are required to ensure that all climate finance projects and programmes are designed with the advancement of gender equality in mind. This is necessary to reduce the risk of exacerbating inequalities and ensure responsiveness to the needs of women and girls.






**Figure 17:** Share of gender integration (i.e., gender marker of significant or principal) in Nordic climate-specific grants and concessional loans targeting **adaptation** broken down by country.



**Figure 18:** Share of gender integration (i.e., gender marker of significant or principal) in Nordic climate-specific grants and concessional loans targeting **both adaptation and mitigation** (cross-cutting) broken down by country.



**Figure 19:** Share of gender integration (i.e., gender marker of significant or principal) in Nordic climate-specific grants and concessional loans targeting **mitigation** broken down by country.

#### 5.3.4. Gender integration across sectors and sub-sectors

The OECD-DAC CRS includes information on the sector and sub-sector reported by donors for each activity. The largest sector across the 10-year period of the study is general environment protection. In 2021, for example, this sector accounted for 35% of all Nordic climate-specific grants and concessional loans. Most of this is committed by Norway, whose finance is overwhelmingly directed toward this sector, while the other Nordic countries spread their finance more evenly across sectors, as shown in tables 6-9. The other main sectors financed by the Nordics are i) energy, ii) agriculture, forestry and fishing, iii) other multisector, iv) government and civil society and v) water supply and sanitation. Activities within the other multisector category include urban and rural development and aid for basic social services.

While the general environment protection sector and energy sectors receive the largest amounts of Nordic climate-specific grants and concessional loans, only a very small proportion of this finance also targets gender equality. In 2021, just 17% of Nordic climate finance reported within the general environment protection sector was assigned a gender marker of significant and 1% was assigned a gender marker of principal. For the energy sector, 24% was assigned a gender marker of significant and 0% was assigned a gender marker of principal. Thus, over three quarters of climate finance committed by the Nordics that flows to the general environmental protection and energy sectors does not consider gender equality as an objective.

There is also a close alignment between flows of finance to the climate objective and different sectors. There is a prevalence of mitigation finance in the general environmental protection and sectors – in 2021, 68% of general environment protection finance and 93% of energy finance targeted mitigation. Thus, the low levels of gender integration in this sector are in line with the findings of Section 5.3.3 which showed that gender integration tends to be lower for activities that target mitigation.

## Denmark

Sector	Millions USD	% of 2021 commitments	Of which adaptation	Of which cross-cutting	Of which mitigation
Energy	118	38%	1%	0%	99%
Water Supply & Sanitation	77	25%	65%	10%	25%
General Environment Protection	43	14%	43%	55%	2%
Business & Other Services	40	13%	24%	0%	76%
Other Multisector	17	6%	7%	93%	0%
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	5	2%	59%	1%	40%
Other sectors	13	4%	86%	1%	13%
<b>Total</b>	<b>314</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>55%</b>

**Table 6:** Climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by Denmark broken down by sector and objective. Data shown for 2021.

## Finland

Sector	Millions USD	% of 2021 commitments	Of which adaptation	Of which cross-cutting	Of which mitigation
Banking & Financial Services	53	34%	11%	0%	89%
Government & Civil Society	29	19%	53%	39%	9%
Energy	16	10%	0%	0%	100%
Education	14	9%	3%	71%	26%
Population Policies/Programmes & Reproductive Health	12	7%	100%	0%	0%
Other Multisector	10	6%	21%	24%	55%
Other sectors	22	14%	12%	68%	20%
<b>Total</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>51%</b>

**Table 7:** Climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by Finland broken down by sector and objective. Data shown for 2021.

## Norway

Sector	Millions USD	% of 2021 commitments	Of which adaptation	Of which cross-cutting	Of which mitigation
General Environment Protection	425	58%	4%	5%	91%
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	105	14%	72%	1%	27%
Energy	101	14%	0%	0%	100%
Other Multisector	36	5%	100%	0%	0%
Government & Civil Society	32	4%	6%	3%	91%
Education	19	3%	70%	0%	30%
Other sectors	10	1%	96%	0%	4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>728</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>21%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>76%</b>

**Table 8:** Climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by Norway broken down by sector and objective. Data shown for 2021.

## Sweden


Sector	Millions USD	% of 2021 commitments	Of which adaptation	Of which cross-cutting	Of which mitigation
General Environment Protection	100	21%	41%	57%	2%
Other Multisector	87	19%	87%	12%	0%
Energy	65	14%	18%	12%	70%
Government & Civil Society	62	13%	79%	15%	6%
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	56	12%	82%	18%	0%
Industry, Mining, Construction	41	9%	0%	4%	96%
Other sectors	53	11%	73%	17%	10%
<b>Total</b>	<b>464</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>57%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>21%</b>

**Table 9:** Climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by Sweden broken down by sector and objective. Data shown for 2021.

## All Nordics

Sector	Millions USD	% of 2021 commitments	Of which adaptation	Of which cross-cutting	Of which mitigation
General Environment Protection	575	35%	13%	19%	68%
Energy	300	18%	4%	3%	93%
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	175	11%	72%	9%	19%
Other Multisector	150	9%	77%	19%	4%
Government & Civil Society	126	8%	55%	17%	28%
Water Supply & Sanitation	95	6%	64%	15%	22%
Other sectors	240	14%	37%	7%	56%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,662</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>54%</b>

**Table 10:** Climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by the Nordic countries broken down by sector and objective. Data shown for 2021.




**Figure 20:** Gender markers assigned to the climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by the Nordic countries, broken down by sector. Data displayed for all Nordic countries combined and for the largest sectors over the 10-year period 2012-2021.

In contrast, the other large sectors funded by Nordic climate finance have much higher levels of gender integration, as shown in Figure 20. These sectors also have a much higher balance between objectives, and a greater focus on adaptation finance. While the higher level of gender integration in these sectors is welcomed, accelerated efforts are needed to ensure that gender equality is embedded in the design of all programmes within these key sectors.

Most of the finance committed under the general environmental protection sector is directed toward the environmental policy and administrative management sub-sector - 80% in 2021. This sector is so large that in 2021 it received 28% of the total 1662 million USD in climate-specific grants and concessional loans. Examples of projects assigned to this category include the Denmark funded *Northern Rangelands Trust: Resilient Communities and Natural Resources*, the Sweden funded *Coral Reef Initiative for Capacity Building Measure*, the Norway funded *Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI)* and the Finland *Improving the Adaptation to Climate Change by Enhancing Weather and Climate Services in Sudan*, which highlights the diversity of projects which are reported within the sub-sector.

The environmental policy and administrative management sub-sector has a particularly low-level gender integration in comparison to the other sub-sectors. In 2021, 0% of finance assigned to the subsector had a gender marker of principal and just 12% had a gender marker of significant, meaning that 88% of finance did not consider gender equality. In 2021, the subsector accounted for 50% of all Nordic finance committed with a gender marker of zero.

The environmental policy and administrative management sub-sector appears to be a default classification, where environment-related activities which cannot be easily captured within other groups are classified. The activities recorded under this classification are therefore wide-ranging, making it difficult to understand why there is such a lack of gender integration in the sub-sector. The finance flowing toward this category is, however, largely directed toward mitigation objectives (76% in 2021), which is in line with the findings of Section 5.3.3.




**Figure 21:** Gender markers assigned to the climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by the Nordic countries, broken down by sub-sector. Data displayed for all Nordic countries combined and for the largest sectors sub-sectors over the 10-year period 2012-2021.

The other large sub-sectors financed by the Nordics over the 10-year period are i) water sector policy and administrative management, ii) democratic participation and civil society, iii) energy generation, renewable sources iv) energy policy and administrative management, v) agricultural development and vi) rural development. The rural development, agricultural development, water sector policy and administrative management and democratic participation and civil society sectors have relatively high levels of gender integration, as shown in Figure 21. Again, these activities tend to be focussed on adaptation or cross-cutting objectives, rather than mitigation.

### 5.3.5. Gender integration across recipient country characteristics

Nordic countries commit different amounts of climate-related development finance to different recipient income groups<sup>38</sup>. Least Developed Countries (LDCs), such as Ethiopia and Yemen, are the grouping with the highest average vulnerability to the impacts of climate change coupled with the lowest adaptive capacities (Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative, 2017) and have received the most amount of Nordic financing over the years 2012-2021. Finance committed to the LDCs is reported with relatively high levels of gender integration – of the financing committed by the Nordic nations in 2021, for example, 64% has a gender equality marker of significant, 2% has a gender equality marker of principal and just 33% reports no gender integration. The relatively high level of gender-responsive finance committed to LDCs should be applauded, as it is money flowing to some of the most climate-vulnerable communities in the world.

<sup>38</sup> The DAC List of ODA Recipients shows all countries and territories eligible to receive official development assistance (ODA). These consist of all low- and middle-income countries based on gross national income (GNI) per capita as published by the World Bank, with the exception of G8 members, EU members and countries with a firm date for entry into the EU. The list also includes all the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as defined by the United Nations (UN).



**Figure 22:** Gender markers assigned to the climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by the Nordic countries in the period 2018-2021, broken down by recipient income group. Data displayed for all Nordic countries combined. The darkest shade of colour (e.g., dark blue for LDCs) represents finance with a gender marker of principal while the lighter shade represents finance with a gender marker of significant. Light grey represents finance with a gender marker of zero, indicating that the finance has been screened and found not to target gender. Dark grey indicates finance with a gender marker that has been left blank, indicating that it has not been screened for gender.

The Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs), such as El Salvador and Philippines, and the Upper Middle-Income Countries (UMICs), such as Botswana and Ecuador, see lower levels of gender integration. In 2021, 27% of finance committed to LMICs was assigned a gender equivalent marker of significant and 0% was assigned a gender marker of principal. Of the finance committed to the UMICs, 32% was reported with a gender marker of significant and just 1% with a gender marker of principal. Thus, a large share of the finance targeting the LMICs and UMICs is reported as having no integration (73% and 68% respectively). The level of gender integration in finance for the UMICs has, however, generally increased since 2018 (see Figure 22).

As can be observed in Figure 22, the more economically developed the recipient country, the *less* likely it is that it will receive gender-responsive climate finance from the Nordic countries. As more economically developed countries tend to have higher energy demands and higher adaptive capacities, the link between least developed countries receiving higher levels of gender-responsive finance may be a result of them receiving larger proportions of adaptation compared to mitigation finance. Indeed, the UMICs and LMICs receive a much higher proportion of mitigation finance than the LDCs (the share of mitigation finance in 2021 was 33%, 62% and 77% for the LDCs, LMICs and UMICs respectively).

LDCs, LMICs, and UMICs are not spread evenly throughout the world's continents. For example, 32 of the 46 LDC nations are in Africa, while the majority of South American countries are classified as UMICs. In 2021, 92% of the finance directed toward the LDCs was committed to the South of Sahara region. Of the finance directed toward the UMICs, 65% was directed toward South America. The finance committed toward the LMICs is slightly more evenly split between the South of Sahara (49%), Far East Asia (21%) and South America (11%).

In line with the results seen by income group classification, climate finance committed toward the South of Sahara region shows a relatively high level of gender integration, with 45% of finance assigned a gender marker of significant and 1% assigned a gender marker of principal in 2021. Of the finance directed

toward South America, just 30% has a gender marker of significant and 0% has a gender marker of principal, which is low though broadly in line with the results found for UMICs. Of the finance reported for Far East Asia just 10% has a gender marker of significant and 0% has a gender marker of principal, which is much lower than the average seen in the LMICs.

The finance committed to Far East Asia and South America is largely focussed on mitigation objectives. In 2021, 87% of climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed to South America and 93% committed to Far East Asia was for mitigation. The finance directed toward these regions is also dominated by specific sectors. General environment protection accounted for 68% of financed projects in South America and 55% in Far East Asia in 2021. Far East Asia also saw a high share of energy projects, at 34% in 2021. Comparatively, the South of Sahara receives a much more balanced distribution of finance. Furthermore, the largest donor to the two regions is Norway, who contributed 86% of finance for South America and 71% of finance for Far East Asia in 2021. The prevalence for mitigation projects in these regions, and in particular mitigation projects within the general environment protection sector, reflects the findings of Section of 5.3.3 and 5.3.4 where it was found that these categories are reported with the lowest levels of gender integration, as well as the low levels of gender integration reported for projects committed by Norway.


### 5.3.6. Gender integration across channels of delivery

There are several different channels of delivery available for donors to disburse funds that should be considered when assessing the abilities of Nordic nations to mainstream gender into their climate finance. The three main channels utilised by the Nordics are i) multilateral organisations, ii) public sector institutions (including the Nordic development agencies themselves), and iii) non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs). In 2021, 86% of climate-related development finance was committed through these three implementing channels, compared to 14% that was committed through private sector institutions, public-private partnerships and networks, teaching and research institutes and think-tanks. The Nordic countries have a similar distribution across the three main channels, except for Denmark who tends to commit a much larger proportion of finance through public sector organisations and less through NGOs and CSOs, as shown in Table 11.

Channel of Delivery	Share of 2021 concessional, climate-specific finance				
	Denmark	Finland	Norway	Sweden	All Nordics
Multilateral Organisations	38%	40%	40%	50%	43%
Public Sector Institutions	41%	6%	1%	6%	10%
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society	12%	36%	44%	27%	33%
University, college or other teaching institution, research institute or think-tank	4%	6%	10%	13%	9%
Private sector institution	4%	12%	2%	0%	3%
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and Networks	1%	1%	3%	3%	2%

**Table 11:** Share of climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed through different channels of delivery by the Nordic countries. Data shown for 2021.





**Figure 23:** Gender markers assigned to the climate-specific grants and concessional loans committed by the Nordic countries in the period 2018-2021, broken down by channels of delivery. Data displayed for all Nordic countries combined. The darkest shade of colour (e.g., dark green for multilateral organisations) represents finance with a gender marker of principal while the lighter shade represents finance with a gender marker of significant. Grey represents finance with a gender marker of zero, indicating that the finance has been screened and found not to target gender.

When analysing the degree of gender integration across the three main channels of delivery, the experiences of NGOs and CSOs in delivering gender-responsive climate finance comes to the fore. Climate finance flowing through non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations has the highest share of both principal and significant gender markers of any of the available channels. In 2021, 4% of the climate-specific grants and concessional loans channelled through this category was assigned a gender marker of principal and 45% was assigned a gender marker of significant.

While there are some organisations which integrate gender in their decision making and have specific gender policies, such as the Green Climate Fund, the climate finance delivered by the multilateral organisations is reported with slightly lower levels of gender integration. Similarly, while we might expect that greater control over project design for activities delivered by development agencies would imply the ability to ensure gender responsiveness is integral to the activities, there is lower levels of gender integration in the climate finance that is channelled through public sector institutions including the Nordic development agencies themselves.

## 6. Assessment of implementation of gender in climate development cooperation

After having established the extent to which gender is integrated in the climate-related development finance committed by the Nordic countries in Chapter 5, this chapter continues by assessing the quality of this integration through assessments of a sample of projects and programmes. The chapter first presents the most important aspects of the research design and methodological choices and then discusses the main findings of the qualitative assessments, demonstrating weak areas and gaps as well as highlighting best practices by providing examples from various projects.

### 6.1. Methodology

In the first version of this report, projects assessed from the period 2012-2019 were selected according to a set of criteria. First, projects were selected across the types of aid: bilateral commitments, earmarked multilateral commitments and core funding to multilaterals. Next, projects were chosen equally between gender equality markers of significant and principal, as well as across mitigation, adaptation, and cross-cutting objectives. Further, the projects were selected across different implementing agencies (i.e., NGOs, Multilaterals, and other). Finally, preference was given to larger scale projects as these larger projects tend to have greater amounts of (publicly accessible) documentation. This represents a limitation of the selection criteria. Following this criteria, 28 projects were analysed.

In the update to this study, a further set of projects were selected for the years 2020 and 2021. Informed by the results of the previous study and in line with previous criteria, the projects selected for analysis were chosen across gender equality markers and mitigation, adaptation, and cross-cutting objectives. Preference was again given to larger scale projects, again to ensure accessible information.

The documents of the selected projects, programmes, and Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) were collected through extensive desk research from respective ministries' websites as well as through various organisations, country offices and embassies. The project documents were assessed with accompanying documents and annexes based on availability. Otherwise, only the concept notes, results framework or funding applications were utilized.

The selected documents for each project were assessed by applying a set of questions that were adapted from the OECD DAC Gender Policy Marker guidelines. The gender marker criteria were applied by asking specific in-depth questions under each area to assess how gender mainstreaming is operationalized in the projects. Each document was assessed on a score from 0 (gender not addressed) to 5 (gender very well addressed) per question followed by a qualitative elaboration by the researchers where relevant.

This part of the assessment addresses for example whether projects included a contextualized gender analysis, whether findings from the gender analysis informed the design of the project, the level of ambition of the project to advance gender equality and/or women's empowerment and the application of gender sensitive monitoring, evaluation, and data collection practices. This framework for assessment of project documents made it possible to evaluate both the ambition and the level of operationalization of a gender sensitive approach in the specific projects and to address main strengths and weaknesses in applying a gender approach to climate finance. As the selection criteria also included core funding to multilateral institutions, the assessment framework was adapted to be applicable for MoUs as well (See Annex 1 for assessment framework).

Due to time and resource limitations, the number of projects assessed per country was limited. Accessibility and transparency were also significant barrier in this process, as it was only possible to analyse the documents available to the researchers. Lack of access to detailed information means that a project may have addressed a gender element included in the assessment, but this was not mentioned in the documents available.

## 6.2. Best Practices and Identified Gaps in Gender Integration

### 6.2.1. Gender treated as a box to tick

As the policy assessments (see Chapter 3) have shown, the Nordic countries in this study boast of having gender equality as a fundamental value. Many policies, strategies, and plans make clear their intentions to integrate gender across thematic areas, which generally includes conducting a gender analysis on the programme and project level. However, while the qualitative assessment of selected climate-related project and programme documents has demonstrated that most projects entail such a gender analysis or gender is addressed as part of a context analysis, there exist substantive differences. To a large extent, the gender analyses have been found lacking in sufficient detail on differences between women and men, girls and boys in terms of their vulnerabilities, distribution of resources, opportunities and power. Too often, the gender analysis narrative is deemed concluded by including a few sentences on the level of gender equality in the country of implementation, only referring to other very general gender-related frameworks or one short paragraph on gender as part of a context analysis.

Throughout the projects assessed, a general observation is the use of buzzwords related to gender, inclusion, empowerment and so on without any actual follow-up. This may be accompanied by declarations on the importance of gender equality and intentions to advance gender equality while not making it a significant or principal objective. This is evident in the latest OECD-DAC CRS data, where we see that in 2021 the level of gender integration across the Nordics has declined to 43%, primarily due to Sweden's decline in gender responsive climate finance. Though most policies and strategies declare the importance of gender equality, projects and programs are unwilling to commit to this by setting gender as a principal or significant objective. This may result in climate projects treating gender as a box to tick. It is surprising to note gender mainstreaming is at the level of 'do no harm' and not pursued as a transformative agenda.

### 6.2.2. Too much talk – not enough action

Despite the quality of the gender analysis, there is a tendency throughout the assessed projects that findings from the gender analysis are not actively used to inform the design of the projects. There is a gap in translation of the findings into action or concrete activities that can be considered gender responsive or transformative. The Finish-funded *Uongozi Institute III Phase* project (CRS ID 2017170083) shows gender integrated throughout the design of the funding agreement and an extensive description of women's issues and gender inequality in Tanzania is addressed, referring to internationally recognized human rights frameworks, such as concluding observations from the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Human Rights Committee. However, gender related activities are not required or considered for the ensuing projects. The funding agreement's narrative could have ensured gender equality is pursued through specified indicators, targets or requirements that explicitly address gender inequality.

At the programming level, the Danish-funded programme on *Accelerating Wind Power Generation in Ethiopia* (CRS ID 2016001197ab) and Denmark's *ISEG Thematic Programme: Inclusive and Sustainable Economic Growth* project (CRS ID 2016001190aa) provide examples of projects which include gender-screening tools as annexes but do not meaningfully integrate gender across the project design and implementation. Despite highlighting the barriers for women in the energy sector and including explanations of contextual inequalities, the narratives did not evidence initiatives or concrete indicators specifically addressing gender inequalities. Narratives at this level are important to ensure that a higher level of coherence is achieved in the projects. If this coherence and ensuing ambition is not achieved, the often extensive information on women's issues and barriers gathered within the gender analysis are devalued. Focus on specific activities with gender specific indicators in the results framework is important to root gender transformative action as an integrated part of the project. This is significant to reduce the normalization of doing gender for the donor's benefit. The Danish projects that were assessed reflect the limitations of

the screening tools where the mere existence of the tools does not necessarily mean that gender is well integrated into a programme or project.

In the Norwegian *Climate Change Resilience and Inclusion in Vietnam* project (CRS ID 2018001958), the information gained through the gender analysis is well reflected in the results framework through gender specific indicators, and this project is therefore considered a strong example. The results framework requires either exact numbers or percentages on the number of women who, for example, start and complete a training course. Specific numbers or goals have not been added, but a tool to measure and evaluate progress has been established, and an example could look like this: “# of women starting and % of women completing the training course.” (see p. 16-18). In general, throughout the project document, concrete targets and measures are presented and the importance of collecting sex-disaggregated data is emphasised.

### **6.2.3. Risk of perpetuating or reinforcing gender inequalities**

Another challenge across the projects and programmes has been to include measures to mitigate potential risks of unintentionally perpetuating or reinforcing gender inequalities or increasing risks for women and girls in the context of the intervention. Most projects are found to take for granted or overlook the risk of unintentionally perpetuating gender inequalities despite having an extensive risk analysis. These tend to look at mostly external factors and not at the risks associated with their own initiatives.

The Norwegian-funded *Climate Change Resilience and Inclusion in Vietnam* (CRS ID 2018001958) is an example of a project that despite having an extensive risk analysis failed to understand its own risk of potential increase in Gender-Based Violence (GBV) or sexual harassment and abuse in the context of the intervention. The project generally seeks to address climate injustice through engaging local communities in both decision-making and collective action, with a special focus on women, people with disabilities and ethnic minorities. Concretely, the project includes gender trainings and provides access to stable income through microfinance aimed towards women. It aims at strengthening women’s full and meaningful participation and mainstreaming gender in activities relating to the project. The project uses gender sensitive language and gender specific indicators to track outcomes. Despite doing very well in terms of targeting women directly, the project however did not manage to include any sections or considerations of its own risks, for example the potential increase in GBV at a household level when women are financially supported but male family members are not targeted. As such, challenges to masculinity and power relationships are not addressed as part of the initiatives.

These observations are specifically noteworthy considering that a ‘do no harm’ approach is to be adopted in every project that has a GEM of significant as a minimum standard. One case of a project that does aim at acknowledging the risks associated with the project itself despite not targeting gender specifically is the Danish funded *Durable Solutions in Somalia 2017-20* project (CRS ID 2017001304). This project acknowledges the risk of a gender focus negatively affecting households and women, wherefore the project aims at the following mitigation strategy: “planning and activities targeting women include men in appropriate ways; male leaders engaged to support women’s involvement in decision making; gender impact of programme (positive & negative) closely monitored”. The project does thereby not only mitigate potential risks, but also addresses underlying patriarchal norms and power relations. The Swedish-funded *Wetlands Program Phase 2 Mali* project (CRS ID 2017061375A) is another good example of a project that extensively manages to address potential risks the project may cause through a gender strategy with a section dedicated to this topic. Through five guiding questions the project considers whether there “is a possibility the project might reduce women’s access to or control of resources and benefits” (Gender strategy, page 26).

### **6.2.4. Women as agents of change**

Another challenge found in the quantitative findings is that gender as a targeted action across the Nordic countries remains low in climate-related projects and programmes. The assessments have shown a general

tendency of gender integration stopping at a level of targeting women as beneficiaries, rather than as agents of change.

There are challenges across projects in achieving women's full and meaningful participation and at increasing women's economic empowerment specifically through green technology, which is one of the commitments in the enhanced GAP. As an example, the Finnish-funded *Uongozi Institute III Phase* (CRS ID 2017170083) addresses the issue of women's economic situation as follows: "Another concern was that the proportion of women among wage earners is low, constituting only about 30 per cent of paid employees". The fact that the project does manage to come up with this finding is a step in the right direction. However, as is often the case when gender analysis is not translated properly into initiatives, the project narratives indicate that the presence of data on gender disparities is enough, without necessarily linking this knowledge to women's economic empowerment or access to jobs or other income generating activities. Especially where the gender analysis shows disparities, such as in the energy and green technology sector, there is a lack of attention on addressing the causes for these disparities or the role women have in changing them. This tendency risks reinforcing gender stereotypes by victimizing women and not acknowledging the potential for women in a more technical, or in this case energy-related, field. If women are presented as more vulnerable and more at risk of climate change, but not integrated at a decision-making level or in an empowering way throughout the design of the project, the measure might not only fail to live up to gender mainstreaming standards but can result in unintentional harm.

In the Swedish support for the *Disaster Risk Reduction Framework 2021-2025* (CRS ID 2021060222A) a broad gender analysis is included and the project "seeks to redress the underlying causes of vulnerability by putting women's resilience at the centre of disaster risk reduction strategies". However, the project is reported to not target gender (gender marker of zero) and the intentions are not at all reflected in concrete initiatives or means of monitoring. It is not expected that all climate related projects have gender equality as a principal or even significant objective; however, as gendered vulnerabilities are highlighted in the framework, it would make sense to meaningfully include women as agents of change, using their knowledge and experience to decrease their vulnerabilities, or working specifically with the societal gendered norms that leave women more vulnerable to climate disasters<sup>39</sup>. When this is not achieved or even attempted, gendered vulnerabilities persist and women are excluded as agents of change-

A few of the assessed projects do manage to address women's economic issues and barriers, but in these cases the solutions are mostly not linked to green technology. Considering that the OECD DAC Rio Markers were part of the selection criteria for the projects assessed as part of this study, it is additionally observed that the OECD DAC Rio Markers are not always being applied thoroughly.

The Finnish-funded *Sustainable Livelihoods and Forest Governance* in Myanmar (CRS ID 2018180339) serves as an example of how women's economic empowerment can be addressed in climate-related activities by, for example, ensuring equal representation of women as key stakeholders in activities: "At least 50% of small-scale enterprise initiative participants should be women. The possibility for women only initiatives should also be considered. The gender equitable distribution of profits gained should be ensured." (p. 22).

### **6.2.5. Neglect of gender in mitigation projects**

The lack of or inattention to women's empowerment or participation in green technology is a consistent tendency in mitigation-focused projects. The project documents assessed have demonstrated that more technical, often mitigation-related initiatives, tend to neglect a gender perspective as it is considered irrelevant or not suitable in some cases. This was also discussed in Chapter 3, for example, where the only objective in Denmark's current development strategy addressing the gender-climate nexus risks perpetuating gendered norms and practices in relation to mitigation efforts; the strategy only highlights

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<sup>39</sup> [IUCN Disaster and Gender Statistics](#)

gender equality through clean energy in the home but neglects the significant gender disparity in the overall energy sector and the barriers to women's meaningful participation in green technologies.

The Danish funded *Accelerating Wind Power Generation in Ethiopia* (CRS ID 2016001197ab) demonstrates the lack of significant gender sensitivity in energy-focused or technical projects where gender is strategically mentioned without clear actions. The programme is part of the efforts of the Government of Ethiopia to diversify their renewable energy generation to increase their climate resilience through strengthening their institutional capacity in the energy sector. The project's gender screening tool identifies a low level of female staff as the only challenge and opportunity in the context of the project. However, despite a formulated effort to ensure involvement of female staff within the tool, there are no further commitments, the results framework does not show any gender specific indicators, and nor is there an effort or requirement for sex-disaggregated data to be collected.

#### **Denmark funded *Indonesia-Denmark Energy Partnership Project 2020-2025***

**CRS ID:** 2020000313ac

**Recipient:** Indonesia

**Gender equality marker:** Not targeted

**Adaptation marker:** Not targeted

**Mitigation marker:** Principal

**Sector:** Energy

**Budget:** DKK 60,000,000

**Channel of delivery:** Public sector institutions

The Danish funded Energy Partnership Project in Indonesia does not designate gender as either a significant or principal objective. No specific gender analysis has been undertaken but the project document reports that less women are employed in the energy sector. The project seeks to address this by aiming for a gender balance in capacity building of staff. When relevant, the project intends to disaggregate reporting and indicators by gender. Hence, the project has a focus on not excluding women, but doesn't explicitly seek to address their specific needs, rights, and empowerment. The focus on women relates to staff and participators in the project, with no attention directed toward the local community and those affected by the project's implementation. The approach lacks specific commitments, and there is no mapping of who is left behind or most marginalized in this context.

A gender screening of the Danish funded *Indonesia-Denmark Energy Partnership Project* (CRS ID 2020000313ac) also finds that less women are employed in the energy sector, which the project will address by aiming for a gender balance in capacity building of staff. Hence, the project has a focus on not excluding women, but doesn't aim at promoting their specific needs, rights, and empowerment. The focus on women relates to staff and participators in the project, while no attention is given to the local community in general and those affected by the implementation of the energy project. The approach is not operationalised to specific commitments, and there is no mapping of who is left behind and most marginalised in the context.

The joint concept paper<sup>40</sup> that the Danish Energy Agency has elaborated together with Danish MFA should be highlighted. It contains a multidimensional poverty, human rights-based approach and gender. It is the hope that this paper can be utilised for the future programming of the Danish Energy Agency's projects.

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<sup>40</sup> *Forståelsespapir om det flerdimensionelle fattigdomsbegreb og den menneskeretlige tilgang i Energistyrelsens myndighedssamarbejder*

The Swedish *Energia* project (CRS ID 2018061548A) is seen to integrate gender well at all levels. It is a ‘best in class’ mitigation project. The project aims at ensuring reliable and sustainable electricity for men and women in Mozambique, while at the same time catalysing women’s economic empowerment in the sustainable energy value chain, for them to become leaders and decision-makers in businesses and in their homes. The project has an empowering tone towards women and gender-related initiatives and builds on a result-based management that aligns local context to mutual accountability. This project occupies the gender transformative space to affect collective direction for social change and is a good reference for how similar projects could increase gender mainstreaming.

#### **6.2.6. Capacity and staffing**

When it comes to staff and capacities, there is little clarity in ensuring competency within projects and capacity building towards a gender transformative approach. Projects do not consistently focus on ensuring equal representation of women and men nor diversity amongst project personnel. This becomes specifically interesting in projects where a focus is on economic empowerment of women or building capacities as an objective but there is a failure to acknowledge the need for project staff to be trained on gender issues and to ensure that female staff are included at all levels of the project.

Many projects assessed had a general assumption of capacity in project offices. Most projects, even if very advanced on other areas such as the *Climate Change Resilience and Inclusion in Vietnam* project funded by Norway (CRS ID 2018001958), do not have specific gender capacity requirements nor equal representation of men, women and diversity. Sweden’s *Energia* project (CRS ID 2018061548A), which demonstrates many best practices in regard to women’s empowerment and meaningful participation in a mitigation-focused project, fails at ensuring that the project itself mainstreams gender through equal representation of men and women including diversity among project staff at all levels. The *Indonesia-Denmark Energy Partnership Project* (CRS ID 2020000313ac) highlighted the gender disparities in staffing in the energy sector but presented no specific initiatives or commitments to amend this.

The Finnish-funded project *Sustainable Livelihoods and Forest Governance* (CRS ID 2018180339) demonstrates what a requirement for equal representation could look like, committing to increasing the percentage of female staff at all programme levels and training all staff on gender issues: “In Phase 2, [ ] will be increasing the percentage of female staff on the programme at all levels of management, and will hire full-time gender equality expertise. All programme staff will also be trained on gender issues and how to incorporate women’s empowerment throughout the programme’s activities”. Another excellent example is the Swedish *Wetlands Program Phase 2 Mali* project (CRS ID 2017061375A). In this project it is recommended that staff from SIDA engage in dialogue to ensure that everyone involved in management and implementation understand why women and girls should be included in decision-making at all levels. The intention is that all staff should receive training and courses in order to develop gender capacities related to biodiversity. It is emphasized that gender trainings need to be done among all levels of staff. It is further recommended that special sessions for water policy, forestry, biodiversity, and fisheries are done and highlighted by a local expert in relation to gender.



Sweden funded *WETLANDS PROGRAM PHASE 2 MALI*

CRS ID: 2017061375A

Recipient: Mali

Gender equality marker: Principal

Adaptation marker: Principal

Mitigation marker: Principal

Sector: Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing

Budget: SEK 79,459,701

Channel of delivery: Public sector institutions

The Swedish-funded *Wetlands* project is an example of a project that addresses potential risks of the project by incorporating a gender strategy with a section dedicated to this topic. The project employs five key questions to assess whether there is a risk of diminishing women's access to or control over resources and benefits. Furthermore, the project directly addresses gender considerations in capacity and staffing. The project advises SIDA staff to engage in dialogue to ensure that everyone involved in management and implementation understand why women and girls should be included in decision-making at all levels. The intention is that all staff should receive training and courses in order to develop gender capacities related to biodiversity. It is stressed that gender trainings should be conducted across all levels of staff.

### 6.2.7. The accuracy and application of Gender Equality Markers

By assessing projects that have been marked with a GEM of principal and significant or that have not been marked at all, this study seeks also to consider whether the OECD markings are relevant and coherent, as well as understanding key differences between projects marked either principal or significant in the OECD system. In this regard, the assessments have pointed to a lack of coherence in the marking. While it cannot be claimed that the markers as such are flawed, the assessments have shown substantial discrepancies in their application. The differences derive, amongst other things, from varying understandings of what gender mainstreaming entails, not least in terms of terminology, e.g., gender integration, gender sensitive programming, gender mainstreaming and gender targeting, to mention just a few.

An often-perceived assumption about the gender markers is that projects with a principal marker are generally better than projects with a significant marker. The study has confirmed that a well-planned significant project may comply better with the questioned criteria than a project that has a principal marker. The lack of consistency in the application of the gender equality markers can also be seen in the high number of projects that have a GEM 1, but do not comply with the minimum criteria.

An example that confirms the challenges of following “only” mainstreaming efforts is the *ISEG Thematic Programme: Inclusive and Sustainable Economic Growth* project in Myanmar funded by Denmark (CRS ID 2016001190aa). It officially has marker of significant, but it does not evidence a meaningful gender perspective. The documentation points to the potential of mainstreaming: “The screening notes for human rights-based approach, gender, climate change and environmental issues confirm that the programme will have good opportunities for keeping basic societal and democratic principles high on the agenda as mainstream concerns.” (p.3). However, the programme seems to navigate these challenges through gender specific indicators using context analysis that indicated gender inequality is not high in Myanmar. The human rights screening tool brings forward that the rights holders who they are specifically focused on are children, disabled, poor communities and marginalized ethnic groups. While stating that social and cultural norms form a barrier for women’s decision-making powers, there are no gender specific indicators. A lot of responsibility is put on the gender mainstreaming approach. This case is an example of the pitfalls of a mainstreaming approach, where the outcome does not result in concrete



indicators or commitments. An improved economic situation for women is seen as the automatic outcome of macroeconomic and inclusive growth programmes.

In contrast, the *Sustainable Livelihoods and Forest Governance* project, as funded by Finland (CRS ID 2018180339), reported a marker of significant is built on an extensive gender analysis. The gender analysis informs the design of the project in terms of “the programme seek[ing] to ensure that women and men benefit equally from activities under all spheres, with the ultimate goal of improving women’s empowerment and gender equality in the region”, including the integration of gender specific indicators in the results framework.

The gender markers can be relevant tools to measure whether or to what extent the gender equality objectives in climate related development projects have been properly defined, and to indicate a level of ambition. For them to be used in an effective manner and achieve intended outcomes, internal capacities need to be strengthened for coherent and fruitful application.

## 7. Conclusions and Recommendations

### INCONSISTENCIES IN GENDER INTEGRATION

It is clear across the development policies and strategies of the four Nordic countries that they are committed to both climate action and gender equality. This study also highlights that the integration of gender into climate finance projects should not be approached as one-size-fits-all, but instead fit to the context of the donor country and the context in which activities operate. Indeed, each Nordic country uses their own individualised gender mainstreaming approach to fit their own cultural and national contexts, demonstrated by the various policy architectures outlined. However, it is also found that there is a lack of consistency across the Nordic countries in ensuring gender is integrated across different climate objectives, sectors, recipient countries, and implementation channels.

### PROVIDING TRANSPARENCY THROUGH REPORTS TO THE UNFCCC

The UNFCCC climate finance reporting requirements provide an opportunity for the Nordics to demonstrate their commitment to gender equality mainstreaming in climate action. While it is not currently mandatory, this can be achieved through the voluntary sharing of project-level gender integration data using the OECD-DAC's Gender Equality Marker in the common tabular format. Sweden currently elects to report aggregate levels of such data, which is an important first step towards encouraging others to do the same and should be commended. This proves that the reporting of gender integration in climate finance at the UN level is a realistic and achievable goal for Annex II nations, and something that can serve as inspiration for other nations to do likewise.

**Recommendation 1:** The Nordic countries develop on Sweden's leadership in voluntary reporting on gender integration by submitting gender equality marker data at the project-level in their Biennial Reports to the UNFCCC, for tracking purposes and to encourage and inspire other Annex II nations to do the same.

**Recommendation 2:** The Nordic countries collectively advocate for the tracking of gender in climate finance to be integrated into the Common Tabular Format template for reporting to the UNFCCC (and EU Governance Regulation).

Sweden also provides by far the most information in its narrative biennial report on the need and justification for gender responsive climate finance. Finland and Denmark note the issue as a priority within their climate finance provisions, while Norway does not mention gender in the context of climate finance at all.

Biennial communications to article 9.5 outlining future climate finance provisions are as a rule lacking concrete information (Hattle & Nordbo, 2021). This extends to gender mainstreaming as a topic, which is simply referred to as a thematic area under the Nordics' ODA provision, with no statements of intent on the degree to which finance will be gender responsive.

**Recommendation 3:** The Nordic countries set out their plans for gender integration in climate finance in their future 9.5 communications to the UNFCCC through the use of ambitious and measurable targets, to provide predictable and reliable gender-responsive climate finance to recipient nations and inspire others to do likewise.

### VARIATIONS ACROSS THE NORDIC COUNTRIES

For all Nordic countries combined, the level of gender integration (i.e. finance with a gender marker of either principal or significant) showed a general increase from 38% in 2012 to 51% in 2019 but has since declined to around 40%. This means that approximately 60% of finance committed by the Nordic countries in the last two years does not consider gender as a policy objective. Even at the peak of 56% in 2018, these figures remain too low to consider Nordic climate-finance to be truly gender responsive.

The Nordic countries have a diverse range of thematic areas and goals related to their climate-related development finance and there is a clear difference in the success of the Nordics in their record on integrating gender in climate finance. Sweden provides the highest level of gender-integrated climate finance, having increased sharply in 2014 with the introduction of a feminist foreign policy, demonstrating the potential of applying policy commitments through to the project level. The level of gender integration has, however, fallen somewhat in recent years from a high of 93% in 2017 to 72% in 2021. Sweden also has by far the highest proportion of climate projects marked with a principal GEM, which indicates those projects/programmes with gender equality as a core objective of the activities, though this has likewise decreased from a peak of 26% in 2017 to just 1% in 2020 and 5% in 2021.

In comparison, reported levels of gender integration in the concessional, climate-specific finance of Denmark and Finland in 2021 were 48% and 64% respectively, and most of this is comprised of projects assigned a gender marker of significant rather than principal. Norway has by far the lowest proportion of climate-related development finance with a marker of significant or principal across all years.

Considering that gender equality is a thematic or cross-cutting issue for all the countries' development strategies, these results show that there has been varied success in actual implementation of these cross-cutting strategies.

**Recommendation 4:** Denmark, Finland, and Norway should increase considerably the proportion of their climate finance commitments which have gender integrated, by taking a twin-track approach as recommended by the OECD-DAC GENDERNET (2016) which combines dedicated interventions (gender marker of 2) with gender mainstreaming (gender marker of 1).

#### GENDER INTEGRATION CHALLENGES IN DIFFERENT TYPES OF FINANCE

Irrespective of donor, climate finance in certain types of projects and programmes tended to have lower levels of gender integration. The two sectors with the largest amount of Nordic climate-related development finance over the period, namely general environment protection and energy, are those with some of the lowest rates of gender integration. These two sectors have some of the highest proportions of mitigation financing. A skew towards mitigation finance provision overall is a characteristic shared by many other climate finance providers (Abadie et al., 2013; Carty et al., 2020), and is present in the climate-related development finance of Norway, and to some extent Denmark and Finland. Sweden should be commended for their relatively balanced provision of finance between the objectives. Regardless, the implementation of gender into adaptation finance has seen greater success throughout the Nordics than in their respective mitigation activities.

The environmental policy and administrative management sub-sector appears to be a catch-all classification, which makes up for a sizeable proportion of mitigation finance with a gender marker of not targeted. This sub-sector incorporates “environmental policy, laws, regulations and economic instruments” among others, and is a key sub-sector lacking a feminist approach, especially when considering the lack of women's representation in policy and decision-making positions globally.

There are fundamental challenges to integrating gender into projects which are focussed on reducing emissions (i.e., dealing with a commodity issue as a global public good (Grasso, 2004)). As was found in the project assessments undertaken for this study, more technical, mitigation-related actions often neglect a gender perspective and are often viewed as gender neutral. Adaptation projects have more ‘obvious’ synergies with gender equality objectives, as they deal with reducing vulnerability in human (or environmental) systems (OECD-DAC, 2016). The fact that women, boys and girls have increased vulnerabilities to climate change makes gender inequality a fundamental issue to be dealt with in order to achieve effective climate adaptation (CARE International, 2020). As such, the challenges which face those aiming to implement gender mainstreaming across the two objectives are different.

More efforts are required to ensure that all climate finance projects and programmes are designed with the advancement of gender equality in mind. Mitigation projects can have gender differentiated impacts and many mitigation areas have the potential to support gender equality and empowerment while also

delivering reduction of emissions. All Annex II nations can take note of the relative successes across the Nordics in integrating gender into mitigation projects, from Sweden (86% in 2021) to Norway (10% in 2021). Some of this difference can be assigned to the relative priorities of the different MFAs and importantly, the relative quality of gender marking. However, the largest mitigation projects funded by Norway target forestry and land degradation e.g., through REDD+ (an initiative which encourages project providers to “*fully integrate gender equality into REDD+ mitigation actions*” (FAO, 2021)), shows that much is due to the willingness and ability to identify and act upon underlying gender contexts. To challenge this assumption means to challenge male-dominated development solutions across the energy and general environment protection sectors, among others.

**Recommendation 5:** The Nordic countries should increase efforts to ensure high quality gender equality tracking internally and externally through the OECD-DAC Gender Equality Marker framework, to improve reliability in reporting. Quality assurance of gender markers is recommended.

**Recommendation 6:** UNFCCC Annex II nations, including the Nordic countries, take a targeted approach to ensuring consistent gender integration in climate finance by building capacity in mitigation-related sectors (i.e., energy and forestry sectors).

## GENDER INTEGRATION CHALLENGES IN DIFFERENT RECIPIENT CONTEXTS

The Nordics should be applauded for providing Least Developed Countries (LDCs) with a relatively high level of gender integrated finance - of the concessional, climate-specific finance committed in 2021, 64% had a gender equality marker of significant, 2% had a gender equality marker of principal and just 33% reported no gender integration. It is important these nations are receiving such finance, as they are among the most vulnerable to climate impacts (Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative, 2017).

However, there are worryingly low levels of gender responsive finance the Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs), such as El Salvador and Philippines, and the Upper Middle-Income Countries (UMICs), such as Botswana and Ecuador. In 2021, 27% of finance committed to LMICs was assigned a gender equivalent marker of significant and 0% was assigned a gender marker of principal. Of the finance committed to the UMICs, 32% was reported with a gender marker of significant and just 1% with a gender marker of principal. Thus, a large share of the finance targeting the LMICs and UMICs is reported as having no integration (73% and 68% respectively).

Gender equality as a cross-cutting issue should be integrated in the LMICs and UMICs as much as it is in LDCs (as well as other economic classifications). This represents a sizeable gap that needs to be addressed. Considering the high proportion of South American countries which are UMICs, this has resulted in a very small amount of gender responsive finance being provided to South American countries. Far East Asian countries also receive distinctly low levels. Both regions also have a high share of mitigation projects, directed toward the general environment protection and energy sectors.

**Recommendation 7:** The Nordic countries ensure gender integration is consistent in their climate commitments across recipient countries, especially in more economically developed recipient nations.

## INCONSISTENCIES IN THE APPLICATION OF GENDER CONSIDERATIONS

The assessments carried out in this research point to a serious issue where climate projects seem to treat gender as a tick-box exercise, with a lack of translation into action, concrete initiatives, or gender-disaggregated data collection and impact analysis. Too often, a project’s gender analysis is deemed concluded by including one sentence on the level of gender inequality in the country of implementation or one short paragraph on gender as part of a context analysis. Many projects fail to come up with initiatives that aim at enhancing women’s economic empowerment through green technology, which is one of the commitments in the enhanced GAP.

Despite this, there are many high-quality examples of gender integration in climate projects from the Nordics that can serve to showcase and inspire both enhanced processes in their own countries as well as for other countries. The ‘best in class’ Swedish *Energia* project (CRS ID 2018061548A) is seen to integrate gender well at all levels of the project and gives a clear example of how gender can be effectively integrated into a mitigation project.

**Recommendation 8:** Nordic nations ensure that gender analyses are not performed as tick-box exercises but inform the design of concrete actions within activities where relevant and based on the good experiences presented in this report. Transformative gender approaches should be promoted.

#### OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN FROM BEST PRACTICE

It is clear across the development policies and strategies of the four Nordic countries that they are committed to both climate action and gender equality. However, there is inconsistency in gender integration across climate finance provided by Denmark, Finland, and in particular Norway (and to a lesser extent, Sweden). For these countries, there should now be a focus on ensuring consistency of gender integration in climate activities through a focus on the gender-blind areas identified in this report. Assumptions over which types of projects are relevant to have gender mainstreaming need to be challenged as part of these efforts, in order to achieve consistently high levels of gender-responsive climate finance.

The example of Sweden highlights the opportunities for transparency in reporting on gender integration in climate finance to the UNFCCC and the potential of effectively applying policy commitments through to the project level, having maintained consistently high levels of gender-responsive climate finance across sectors and objectives, including mitigation.

The findings of this report should be taken forward to more effectively target the gaps identified in integrating gender in various sectors, programmes, recipients, and regions in the global climate finance regime. To do this, best practice can be taken from various sources globally, including NGOs and CSOs who have shown that they are able to deliver projects with relatively high levels of gender mainstreaming.

**Recommendation 9:** Implementing organisations develop a continuous learning platform to upgrade knowledge from best practice. This includes creating a mutual learning environment with CSOs and NGOs (both in developed and developing countries) to improve levels and quality of gender integration in climate finance portfolios for all parties.

#### COP26: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

There remain political level opportunities for the Nordics to lead and influence in this space, not least at COP28, where discussions for a new post-2025 climate finance ambition will continue. To lead from the front, the Nordics first need to address the gender gaps in their own climate finance identified in this report.

**Recommendation 10:** The Nordic countries collectively advocate for the establishment of gender integration sub-goals as part of the post-2025 climate finance negotiations.

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# Annexes

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## Annex A: Overview of Nordic climate finance 2012-2021

Country	Type of finance	Gender marker	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Denmark	Climate specific (concessional)	Principal	5	1	0	3	0	0	1	2	1	0	14
		Significant	117	176	144	83	53	66	94	130	75	151	1,089
		Not targeted	104	88	79	17	22	28	74	151	122	163	847
		Blank	0	0	0	0	5	21	0	0	0	0	26
	Climate specific (non-concessional)		0	0	0	0	0	13	13	38	52	66	181
	Total climate specific		227	266	223	103	80	128	181	321	249	380	2,158
	Imputed core contributions		10	64	68	61	63	83	102	101	163	187	903
Total climate finance		237	330	291	164	143	211	284	422	412	567	3,061	
Finland	Climate specific (concessional)	Principal	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	1	6	13
		Significant	25	16	19	20	10	139	25	20	39	93	406
		Not targeted	36	54	56	14	7	26	19	24	33	56	326
		Blank	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	0	13
	Climate specific (non-concessional)		6	0	0	0	17	0	6	75	8	21	134
	Total climate specific		67	70	75	34	35	166	54	119	95	177	893
	Imputed core contributions		7	59	89	92	24	38	51	91	94	145	691
Total		75	129	165	126	59	204	105	210	189	322	1,584	
Norway	Climate specific (concessional)	Principal	6	8	4	2	2	1	1	1	13	4	41
		Significant	89	204	86	44	26	22	50	59	98	132	810
		Not targeted	546	564	774	641	422	518	524	313	373	592	5,267
		Blank	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate specific (non-concessional)		0	0	283	20	17	243	360	99	108	573	1,703
	Total climate specific		641	775	1147	708	466	784	935	472	592	1301	7,821
	Imputed core contributions		49	118	124	114	108	134	134	209	218	0	1,208
Total		690	893	1271	822	575	918	1069	680	810	1301	9,029	
Sweden	Climate specific (concessional)	Principal	15	8	56	19	71	87	129	21	3	24	434
		Significant	234	185	320	189	265	219	559	366	147	313	2,798
		Not targeted	102	107	39	27	44	24	66	92	35	128	664
		Blank	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Climate specific (non-concessional)		0	2	13	0	0	27	52	26	17	37	174
	Total climate specific		352	303	428	236	380	357	806	505	202	502	4,070
	Imputed core contributions		55	169	225	564	140	143	309	256	1068	221	3,150
Total		406	473	653	800	520	499	1114	761	1270	723	7,220	

Country	Type of finance	Gender marker	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
All Nordics	Climate specific (concessional)	Principal	27	17	60	25	73	88	135	24	18	34	502
		Significant	466	582	569	337	354	446	728	575	359	689	5,103
		Not targeted	788	813	948	700	495	596	683	580	563	939	7,104
		Blank	0	0	0	0	5	21	0	0	13	0	40
	Climate specific (non-concessional)		6	2	296	20	34	283	430	239	185	698	2,193
	Total climate specific		1286	1414	1874	1081	961	1434	1976	1417	1138	2360	14,942
	Imputed core contributions		122	411	506	830	335	398	596	656	1544	553	5,953
Total climate finance		1408	1825	2380	1912	1296	1833	2572	2074	2682	2913	20,894	

**Table A:** Overview tables of climate finance committed by the Nordic countries over the period 2012-2021, with concessional finance broken down by gender marker.

## Annex B: Research Methodology and Approach

This appendix outlines the methods used by the research team for this study.

### A.1 Quantitative Analysis

#### B.1.1 Methodological Notes

- The main data source used for quantitative analysis is the provider perspective Climate-related development finance dataset of the OECD-DAC CRS. The provider perspective comprises bilateral contributions and contributions from bilateral providers to international organisations.
- Under the provider perspective, bilateral activities targeting climate change objectives are identified using the Rio markers and the climate share of core contributions to international organisations is estimated by calculating imputed multilateral contributions.
- The OECD-DAC policy markers are applied to bilateral aid, including earmarked contributions channelled through multilateral institutions (multi-bi contributions). The policy markers exclude core contributions to multilateral contributions, and as such imputed multilateral contributions are removed from the analysis.
- Commitments were used as the basis for the measurement of flows.
- The period of study is 2012-2021
- All figures in this report are provided in ‘current’ USD millions.
- The CRS dataset uses “Current thousand USD”, therefore fluctuations in exchange rate will make a difference.

#### B.1.2 Rio Marker accounting methodology

The OECD Development Assistance Committee distinguishes four Rio markers that aim at tracking activities which target environmental objectives cutting across a range of sectors. These markers were borne out of the Rio Conventions, to show alignment with the objectives of the UNFCCC, UNCBD, and UNCCD. A scoring system of three values is used for each of the four Rio markers according to which aid activities are marked as targeting each as a “principal objective” or a “significant objective”, or as not targeting the objective.

Rio markers are applied to all bilateral ODA, except general budget support, imputed student costs, debt relief, administrative costs, development awareness-raising, and refugee reception in donor countries. Core funding for multilateral institutions is not marked by member states individually. Instead, organisations report on the actual allocation of their funds (“multilateral outflows”).

The majority of Annex II nations (with some exceptions, such as the USA and UK) use the Rio Markers as a basis for reporting their climate finance to the UNFCCC and the EU’s MMR/GR<sup>41</sup>. The ‘Rio marker methodology’ for calculating climate finance uses coefficients applied to Climate Rio Marker scores to make an estimate of the proportion of a project’s total budget that can be considered relevant to the objectives of the UNFCCC.

Objective	Rio marker	Description
Principal	2	<i>“An activity can be marked as “principal” when the objective (climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, biodiversity, combating desertification) is explicitly stated as fundamental in the design of, or the motivation for, the activity. Promoting the objective will thus be stated in the activity documentation to be one of the principal reasons for undertaking the activity. In other words, the activity would not have been funded (or designed that way) but for that objective.”</i>
Significant	1	<i>“An activity can be marked as “significant” when the objective (climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, biodiversity, combating desertification) is explicitly stated but is not the fundamental driver or motivation for undertaking and designing the activity. The activity has other prime objectives but has been formulated or adjusted to help meet the relevant environmental concerns.”</i>
Not targeted	0	<i>“The score “not targeted” (“0”) means that the activity was examined but found not to target the objective in any significant way. For activities that have not been assessed with the Rio markers in mind, the “0” value should not be used, but rather the marker field should be left empty. This way, there is no confusion between activities that do not target the objective (score= “0”), and activities for which the answer is not known (score= “null”). This important distinction has implications for statistical presentations of Rio marker data.”</i>

**Table B:** Overview of the Rio Markers and their descriptions (OECD-DAC, 2016).

While coefficients of 100% are applied to projects with principal Rio markers in all cases, within the Rio Marker methodology there is no set international standard coefficient level to be applied to a budget for a project with a “Significant” Rio Marker, as such reporting nations vary in the coefficients they apply. The four Nordic countries are no exception, applying different coefficients to RM1 climate projects.

**To create a standardised dataset, in this analysis the OECD data is adjusted so that a Rio marker score of ‘significant’ results in a financial adjustment of 40%. Thus, the percentages used are 0%, 40% and 100% for scores of not targeted (0), significant (1) and principal (2) respectively. 40% is the most common RM1 coefficient; being used by both Norway and Sweden. Only Denmark uses 50% in its reporting, while Finland uses a range of coefficients on a case-by-case basis.**

Provider	Coefficient applied to RM1 (%)	Coefficient applied to RM2 (%)
Denmark	50%	100%
EU Institutions	40%	100%
Finland	Range of coefficients	Range of coefficients
Norway	40%	100%
Sweden	40%	100%

**Table C:** Rio marker coefficients used by the Nordic countries and EU institutions.

### B.1.3 Grant equivalent calculations

To estimate the real support value of provided finance, we attempt to account for climate finance at its grant equivalent value. The methodology used in this analysis to calculate grant equivalent values is defined by the OECD<sup>42</sup>.

Calculation of grant equivalence for various financial instruments is as follows:

<sup>42</sup> [OECD CONVERGED STATISTICAL REPORTING DIRECTIVES FOR THE CREDITOR REPORTING SYSTEM \(CRS\) AND THE ANNUAL DAC QUESTIONNAIRE](#)

- Grants and equity and shares in investment vehicles have a grant equivalence of 100% and are thus counted at their face value.
- Non-concessional instruments are estimated to have zero direct assistance value and a grant equivalence of 0%. While some finance defined as ‘non-concessional’ may include some level of concessionality, it is not generous enough to, in the case of bilateral finance, be categorized as ODA and as such is not counted as assistance due to the burden that debt places on developing countries.
- The grant equivalence of concessional loans is calculated by calculating the grant element percentage of concessional loans and multiplying that percentage with the face value of the loan as reported by the donor.

The grant element for each donor is calculated by dividing the total grant equivalent value of all climate-related (Rio-marked) ODA loan disbursements by the total face value of those disbursements, as reported by each donor to the ‘bulk’ CRS database for 2021 (OECD, n.d.-a). This step is necessary as grant equivalents are recorded and published only for ODA disbursements, and the climate-related development finance dataset is published based on commitments only. The resulting grant element percentages are shown in Table D. For countries where provider-specific grant element percentages could not be calculated due to data constraints, the weighted average grant element percentages were used (55.3%). After calculating grant element percentages, these coefficients can then be applied to commitments of concessional climate-related loans as reported to the climate-related development finance dataset to determine their grant equivalent value.

Country	Grant element
Austria	26.1%
Belgium	79.8%
Canada	91.8%
France	42.8%
Germany	31.9%
Italy	20.2%
Japan	65.6%
Spain	23.8%
<b>Weighted average</b>	<b>55.3%</b>

**Table D:** Grant element percentages assigned to concessional climate-related loans in 2021. Calculated using the ‘bulk’ CRS database (OECD, n.d.-a).

## B.2 Qualitative Analysis

The qualitative research approach was designed with the participation of ACT Alliance partners. The adapted framework seeks to investigate how “mainstreaming” of gender within the project/programmes and, structure of the organisation and the oversight taken within the project narratives to achieving the Paris Agreement’s Enhanced Lima Work Programme and the new Gender Action Plan (GAP). A list of questions was designed based on the GAP focus areas. With each question follows a scoring system, indicating on which level the theme is addressed/ included from 1-5. The questionnaires used to analyse the different types of documents are provided below.

## B.2.1 General Qualitative Assessment Questionnaire

### Document information:

Name of document	
Type of document	
Provider Country	
Recipient Country	
Year of implementation	
File No.	
CRS I.d.	
Budget in CRS (Current USD Thousands)	
Selection Criteria (Select one)	Bilateral Project/Programme – Mitigation Bilateral Project/Programme – Adaptation Bilateral Project/Programme – Cross-cutting Project/Programme channelled through an NGO Project/Programme channelled through a Multilateral Institution (excluding UN bodies) e.g. International Fund or MDB Project/Programme channelled through a UN bodies Loan or Guarantee
Revised by/date	
Comments/notes	

### **Criteria 1: Is a gender analysis carried out as part of the project?**

1.a Has a gender analysis been carried out – If yes: to what extend does it analyze the differences between and among women and men, girls and boys in terms of their relative distribution of resources, opportunities, constraints and power in the specific context (quality of the gender analysis)?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					



1.b To what extent is gender mainstreamed in stakeholder consultations, needs assessments, climate vulnerability assessments and risk assessments?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

**Criteria 2: Findings from gender analysis have informed the design of the project/programme and the intervention adopts a ‘do no harm’ approach.**

2.a To what extent does the project/programme address the gender inequalities found through the conducted analysis (for example, unequal distribution of resources, decision-making structures, gender differentiated impacts of climate change, etc.)?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

2.b To what extent does the project/programme mitigate the potential risks of unintentionally perpetuating or reinforcing gender inequalities or increasing risks of GBV or sexual harassment and abuse in the context of the intervention?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

2.c To what extent is the language gender-sensitive, i.e. are men and women generally mentioned throughout the document, is stereotypical language avoided, and are gender binaries avoided?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

2.d To what extent have requirements been established regarding gender capacities that the implementing entity/staff must have and/or a capacity building plan to ensure gender capacities?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included

<b>Comments/details:</b>

**Criteria 3: The top-level ambition of the project/programme is to advance gender equality and/or women’s empowerment.**

3.a To what extent does the project seek to promote women’s full and meaningful participation in the project - for example by including affirmative action or specific activities to address gender inequalities and constraints, and meet gender-specific needs and priorities?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

3.b To what extent is it ensured that women and men are equally represented among project staff at all levels?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

3.c Is there a specific approach to promote women’s economic empowerment, income generating activities and/or women’s role in new green technology opportunities?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

3.d To what extent are there approaches to ensure that information is equally available and understandable for all target groups, including marginalized and illiterate people?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

3.e If funding is directed to local organizations, to what extent is funding directed to local women-led and/or gender responsive organizations?

<b>Scoring</b>
----------------

0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

**Criteria 4: The results framework measures progress towards the project/ programme’s gender equality objectives through gender-specific indicators to track outcomes/impact.**

4.a To what extent does the results framework use gender specific indicators, including impact indicators, to monitor and evaluate progress and results that contribute to gender equality and women’s empowerment?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

4.b To what extent does the project’s results framework ensure that women and men, girls and boys, benefit equitably from all the project’s results (for example, a minimum of 50 % of targeted beneficiaries/rights-holders are women and/or girls)?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

**Criteria 5: Data and indicators are disaggregated by sex where applicable.**

5.a To what extent are all indicators that refer to beneficiaries and participants sex-disaggregated?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

**Criteria 6: Commitment to monitor and report on the gender equality results achieved by the project in the evaluation phase.**

Included in questions above

**Distribution of scores 1-5 of the document.** Average score is:

<b>Qualitative assessment:</b>
Overall assessment of document:

Is gender generally integrated in this document in your opinion?
Are any other important aspects of gender responsiveness included/addressed, or are there other significant gender gaps? Does the intervention actively seek to either reach, benefit or empower women? Other comments
Assess whether the gender equality marker of this document is correct in our eyes based on our analysis and according to the criteria laid out by OECD <a href="https://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/Minimum-recommended-criteria-for-DAC-gender-marker.pdf">https://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/Minimum-recommended-criteria-for-DAC-gender-marker.pdf</a>
Existing marking: Your opinion:
Other comments/reflections...

## B.2.2 Qualitative Assessment on MoUs

When assessing Memorandum of Understandings, the scoring sheet was adapted to the following:

### Document information :

Name of document	
Type of document	
Provider Country	
Recipient Country	
Year of implementation	
File No.	
CRS I.d.	
Budget in CRS (Current USD Thousands)	
Selection Criteria (Select one)	Bilateral Project/Programme – Mitigation Bilateral Project/Programme – Adaptation Bilateral Project/Programme – Cross-cutting Project/Programme channelled through an NGO Project/Programme channelled through a Multilateral Institution (excluding UN bodies) e.g. International Fund or MDB Project/Programme channelled through a UN bodies Loan or Guarantee
Revised by/date	
Comments/notes	

### 1. **Gender mainstreaming**

1.1. Is a gender analysis a prerequisite for every project? If yes: to what extent does it analyze the differences between and among women and men, girls and boys in terms of their relative distribution of resources, opportunities, constraints and power in the specific context (quality of the gender analysis)?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

1.2. To what extent does the MoU require that these findings inform the interventions and design of the project?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

1.3. To what extent is it required that gender is mainstreamed into stakeholder consultations, needs assessments, risk assessments, M&E, communication, etc.?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

1.4. To what extent is collection, analysis and application of sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis in the context of climate change promoted in the MoU?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

## 2. Equal participation and gender capacities (staff)

2.1. To what extent is it ensured that women and men are equally represented among project staff at all levels, including decision-making bodies?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

2.2. To what extent have requirements been established regarding gender capacities that the implementing entity/staff must have and/or a capacity building plan to ensure gender capacities?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included

<b>Comments/details:</b>

2.3. In what ways does the document include code of conduct and safeguarding mechanisms to minimize any risk of discrimination (gender or other), including sexual harassment and sexual abuse, amongst staff and in relation to target groups?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

### 3. Gender-responsive implementation

3.1. Does the document mention an approach to promote women’s meaningful participation, economic empowerment and/or women’s role in new green technology opportunities and to what extent does it require that this approach is translated into concrete indicators?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

3.2. To what extent is it required that funding is directed to local women-led and/or gender responsive organizations?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

3.3. To what extent does the MoU require the results framework to ensure that women and men, girls and boys, benefit equitably from all the project’s results (for example, a minimum of 50 % of targeted beneficiaries/rights-holders are women and/or girls)?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

**Distribution of scores 1-5 of the document.** Average score is:

<b>Qualitative assessment:</b>
Overall assessment of document:
Is gender generally integrated in this document in your opinion?

Are any other important aspects of gender responsiveness included/addressed, or are there other significant gender gaps? Does the intervention actively seek to either reach, benefit or empower women? Other comments
Assess whether the gender equality marker of this document is correct in our eyes based on our analysis and according to the criteria laid out by OECD <a href="https://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/Minimum-recommended-criteria-for-DAC-gender-marker.pdf">https://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/Minimum-recommended-criteria-for-DAC-gender-marker.pdf</a>
Existing marking: Your opinion:
Other comments/reflections...

A further adaptation of the assessment was made for climate policy, development policy, and gender policy from each country. These documents were not easily defined, the team found that there are several guiding documents in the relevant ministries. Similar template has been used for assessing a development policy and a gender policy from each country, whereas another and more extensive one was developed for the climate policy.

### B.2.3 Qualitative Assessment on Climate Policies

#### Document information:

Name of document	
Type of document	
Country and institution	
Revised by/date	
Comments/notes	

#### **Priority area A: capacity-building, knowledge management and communication**

A.1 To what extent is collection, analysis and application of sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis in the context of climate change promoted in the policy?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

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A.2 To what extent is there clarity on the role and work of the national gender and climate change focal points?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

A.3 To what extent does the policy strengthen the evidence base and understanding of the differentiated impacts of climate change on men and women?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

A.4 To what extent does the policy promote the use of social media and innovative communication tools to effectively reach out to women on issues related to climate action?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

A.5 To what extent is the language gender-sensitive, i.e. are men and women generally mentioned throughout the document, is stereotypical language avoided, and are gender binaries avoided?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

**Priority area B: gender balance, participation and women’s leadership**

B.1 To what extent is women’s effective participation in climate policy and action promoted – for example through capacity-building in leadership/negotiation, facilitation of negotiation for women, quota systems?



<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

B.2 To what extent is the equal participation of women and gender-oriented organizations funded?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

B.3 To what extent does the policy include a specific approach to promote women's economic empowerment, income generating activities and/or women's role in green technology opportunities?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

**Priority area C: coherence**

C.1 To what extent does the policy strengthen coordination with other national and/or international entities on the implementation of gender responsive climate action?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

C.2 To what extent does it link to global policies and processes that promote gender equality, for example the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development or CEDAW?

<b>Scoring</b>					

0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

**Priority area D: gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation**

D.1 To what extent does the policy integrate gender-responsive budgeting into national budgets to advance gender-responsive climate policies, plans, strategies and action?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

D.2 To what extent are there clear overall goals, expected outcomes, targets, indicators and budget for gender action as part of the climate policy or action plan?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

D.3 To what extent does the policy promote the deployment of gender-responsive technological solutions to address climate change (for example strengthening and preserving traditional knowledge and practices for improving climate resilience, and fostering women’s and girls’ full participation and leadership in science, technology, research and development)?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

D. 4 To what extent are women’s groups and national women and gender institutions engaged in the process of developing, implementing and updating climate policies, plans, strategies and action?

<b>Scoring</b>					
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0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

**Priority area E: monitoring and reporting**

E.1 To what extent is there a commitment to monitor and report on women in leadership positions, engagement in and benefit from climate policies, plans, strategies and actions?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

**Distribution of scores 1-5 of the document.** Average score is:

<b>Qualitative assessment:</b>
Overall assessment of document: Is gender generally integrated in this document in your opinion?
Are any other important aspects of gender responsiveness included/addressed, or are there other significant gender gaps? Does the intervention actively seek to either reach, benefit or empower women? Other comments
Other comments/reflections...
After revising all country policies – narrative interview:  To what extent is there coherence between the commitments put forward on gender responsive climate action between the revised policies? Are there some fundamental gaps? Are there some fundamental differences in the discourse around gender and climate action? (narrative – combine document review with one country interview)

**B.2.4 Qualitative Assessment for Development and Gender Policies**

**Document information:**

Name of document	
Type of document	
Country	

Revised by/date	
Comments/notes	

P.1 To what extent does the policy address gender differentiated impacts of climate change?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

P.2 To what extent does the policy promote women’s effective participation in climate policy and action – for example through capacity-building in leadership/negotiation, facilitation of negotiation for women, quota systems?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

P.3 To what extent does the policy promote women’s equal participation in resource governance and/ or access to economic opportunities linked to climate change initiatives (focusing on mitigation projects, such as green technologies)?

<b>Scoring</b>					
0 Not addressed/included	1 Addressed only very little	2	3 Addressed/included to a certain extent	4	5 Very well addressed/included
<b>Comments/details:</b>					

**Distribution of scores 1-5 of the document.** Average score is:

<b>Qualitative assessment:</b>
Overall assessment of document: Is gender generally integrated in this document in your opinion?
Are any other important aspects of gender responsiveness included/addressed, or are there other significant gender gaps? Does the intervention actively seek to either reach, benefit or empower women? Other comments
Other comments/reflections...

## Annex C: List of persons consulted and documents assessed

### C.1. List of persons consulted

A series of meetings and discussions held with the following participants and key informants from each focused country to advance the first version of this study, as listed below. The research team expresses their gratitude for the support and cooperation given.

Country	Participants
Denmark	<u>Ministry of Foreign Affairs:</u> Siv Behrendt Jens Fugl Morten Houmann Blomqvist Birgitte Bay Susanne Wendt Jeppe Pagh-Rasmussen Ethiopian Embassy of Denmark
Finland	<u>Ministry of Foreign Affairs:</u> Outi Myatt-Hirvonen
Norway	<u>Ministry of Foreign Affairs:</u> Sidsel Bleken Georg Borsting Linn Sande
Sweden	<u>Swedish International Development Cooperation (Sida)</u> Amanda Liedgren Lena Karlsson

### C.2. Policies and Strategies Assessed

#### Initial version of report

- A Green and Sustainable World: The Danish Government's Long-Term Strategy for Global Climate Action
- Denmark's Strategic Framework Gender Equality
- The World 2030 Denmark's Strategy for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Action
- Guideline For the Cross-Cutting Objectives in the Finnish Development Policy and Cooperation
- Theories Of Change and Aggregate Indicators for Finland's Development Policy 2020
- Norway's Freedom, Empowerment and Opportunities - Action Plan for Women's Rights and Gender Equality In Foreign And Development Policy 2016-2020
- Norad's Strategy Towards 2030
- Norway's Climate Strategy For 2030: A Transformational Approach Within a European Cooperation Framework - Norway
- Political Platform for The Norwegian Government, Formed by The Conservative Party, The Progress Party, The Liberal Party and The Christian Democratic Party
- Sweden's En Samlad Politik För Klimatet – Klimatpolitisk Handlingsplan
- Policy Framework for Swedish Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance
- Strategy For Sweden's Development Cooperation for Global Gender Equality and Women's and Girls' Rights 2018–2022

#### Updated version of the report

- Denmark's Act on Gender Equality 2000
- A Green and Sustainable World – The Danish Government's long-term strategy for global climate action
- The World 2030 - Denmark's strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action
- THE WORLD WE SHARE - Denmark's Strategy for Development Cooperation
- The Government's Priorities for Danish Development Cooperation 2022

- Strategic Framework for Gender Equality, Rights and Diversity in Danish Development Cooperation
- Redegørelse/perspektiv- og handlingsplan for ligestilling 2023
- Guideline for the cross-cutting objectives in the Finnish Development Policy and Cooperation
- Finland's international climate finance – steering and effectiveness
- Finland's climate financing needs a clear definition – Development Policy Committee Analysis
- Finland's Development Policy Investment Plan for 2020-2023
- A strong and committed Finland - Programme of Prime Minister Petteri Orpo's Government
- Plan for implementation of Finland's public international climate finance for 2022-2026
- NORAD How we work
- Climate change, hunger and vulnerability – Strategy for climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction and the fight against hunger
- Norway's Climate Action Plan for 2021–2030
- Norway's Climate Strategy for 2030: A transformational approach within a European cooperation framework
- En rettferdig verden er en likestilt verden
- Norad's strategy towards 2030
- Strategi for Sveriges Utvecklingssamarbete for Global Jämställdhet och Kvinnors och Flickors Rättigheter 2022-2026
- Policy framework for Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian assistance – government communication
- Strategy for Sweden's humanitarian aid provided through the Swedish International Cooperation Agency (Sida) 2021-2025
- En samlad politik för klimatet - klimatpolitisk handlingsplan
- Ny klimatpolitik för att nå hela vägen till nettonollutsläpp
- Strategi for Sveriges globala utvecklingssamarbete inom miljö, klimat och biologisk mangfald
- Strategy for Sweden's global development cooperation sustainable economic development 2022-2026
- Utgiftsområde 7 Internationellt bistånd
- Inriktning för det fortsatta arbetet med jämställdhetsintegrering för åren 2022–2025
- Sida's gender toolbox
- Sida's Gender equality, environment and climate change

### C.3. Other Documents Assessed

#### Initial version of report

- Denmark's Fourth Biennial Report under the UNFCCC – 20th December 2019
- Finland's Fourth Biennial Report under the UNFCCC – 20th December 2019
- Norway's Fourth Biennial Report under the UNFCCC – 19th December 2019
- Sweden's Fourth Biennial Report under the UNFCCC – 2nd April 2020 (Resubmission)
- Submission by Norway on information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement – 26 February 2021
- EU Submission on information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement – 20 November 2020

#### Updated version of report

- Denmark's Fifth Biennial Report under the UNFCCC – 27 August 2023
- Finland's Fifth Biennial Report under the UNFCCC – 22 December 2022
- Norway's Fifth Biennial Report under the UNFCCC – 30 March 2023 (resubmission)
- Sweden's Fifth Biennial Report under the UNFCCC – 8 October 2023
- Submission by Norway: Second biennial communication pursuant to Article 9.5 of the Paris Agreement - 1 February 2023
- EU Submission on information to be provided by Parties in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement – 18 October 2022

## C.4. Projects assessed

\*Projects highlighted in orange assessed as part of the updated version of this report. All other documents assessed previously.

### Denmark

Project	CRS I.D	Recipient	Files	GEM	Adaptation marker	Mitigation marker	Channel of delivery	Sector
ACCELERATING WIND POWER GENERATION IN ETHIOPIA THEMATIC PROGRAMME DOCUMENT	2016001197aa	Ethiopia	2016-9613 – Wind Accelerating Ethiopia.pdf (October, 2016)	1	Not targeted/Not screened	Principal	Public Sector Institutions	II.3. Energy
COUNTRY PROGRAMME 2016-2020. ISEG THEMATIC PROGRAMME: INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH	2016001190aa	Myanmar	Country programme Myanmar 2016-2020.pdf (2016)	1	Not targeted/Not screened	Significant	Public Sector Institutions	II.5. Business & Other Services
DMDP, BRAC UK, TANZANIA	2017001260	Tanzania	2017-35891 – BRAC Partnership full proposal (Section 2 on Tz) (1).pdf (12th July, 2018)	2	Significant	Significant	Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society	II.5. Business & Other Services
DURABLE SOLUTIONS IN SOMALIA 2017-20 BY DRC	2017001304	Somalia	Forced displacement in Somalia: applying the durable solutions framework (14th September, 2017)	1	Principal	Not targeted/Not screened	Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society	IV.2. Other Multisector
ETHIOPIA COUNTRY PROGRAMME 2018-2022. TP 3 CLIMATE CHANGE	2018001210	Ethiopia	2018-21742 – Ethiopia Country Programme Document Final 16102018.pdf (2018)	1	Principal	Principal	Public Sector Institutions	III.1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing
EVALUATION OF AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME (AGEP)	2018-16776	Developing countries, unspecified	2018-16776 Bangladesh Country Programme 2016-2021 (2015 – 55730) (only agricultural growth programme).pdf (19th November, 2014)	2	Significant	Not targeted/Not screened	Multilateral Organisations	#N/A
GCF - GREEN CLIMATE FUND	2015001092	Total Mul. P1	2014 – 23256 – Green Climate Fund (Organization Strategy).pdf (September, 2014)	BLANK	Imputed multilateral contributions	Imputed multilateral contributions	Multilateral Organisations	XII. Unallocated / Unspecified

UNEP-DTU PARTNERSHIP	2018001216	Developing countries, unspecified	2017-10514 – UNEP DTU Partnership.pdf (12th June, 2018)	1	Not targeted/Not screened	Principal	Multilateral Organisations	II.3 Energy
DANISH ENERGY PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME III, INDODEPP	2020000313ac	Indonesia	Indonesia-Denmark-Energy-Partnership-Project 2020-25	0	Not targeted/Not screened	Principal	Public Sector Institutions	II.3. Energy

## Finland

Project	CRS I.D	Recipient	Files	GEM	Adaptation marker	Mitigation marker	Channel of delivery	Sector
INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IFAD 10	89891961	Total Mul. P1	Results Framework – IFAD10.pdf (10th November, 2014)	0	Imputed multilateral contributions	Imputed multilateral contributions	Multilateral organisations	#N/A
F.A: TUNDANDOTO TANZANIA PROGRAMME SUSTAINABLY TRANSFORMED CHILDHOODS	2016161138	Tanzania	2016161138 (5054) – F.A. TUNDANDOTO TANZANIA PROGRAMME SUSTAINABLY TRANSFORMED CHILDHOODS (p.28 country specific.pdf (2018)	2	Significant	Significant	Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society	I.3. Population Policies/Programmes & Reproductive Health
UONGOZI INSTITUTE III PHASE	2017170083	Tanzania	2017170083 – Uongozi.pdf (30th September, 2017)	1	Significant	Significant	Public Sector Institutions	I.1. Education
UNODC; SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS AND FOREST GOVERNANCE PHASE 2	2018180339	Myanmar	2018180339 - UNODC Myanmar.pdf (2018)	1	Not targeted/Not screened	Significant	Multilateral Organisations	III.1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing

## Norway

Project	CRS I.D	Recipient	Files	GEM	Adaptation marker	Mitigation marker	Channel of delivery	Sector
COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT OF FOREST ECOSYSTEMS	2018001570	Democratic Republic of the Congo	1701419-45 Regnskogsfondet Norad english results framew.PDF (2018) 1701419 - 1 Other attachments	1	Not targeted/Not screened	Principal	Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society	IV.1. General Environment Protection



			– vedlegg 2 RFN Gender Policy.PDF (September, 2017)					
GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT II, ADD. II, NTALANI, MALI	2018001235	Mali	Annex 3 NORAD Application for GEWEP II PART 2 (EN) – MALI (ID 17303).pdf (2018)	2	Significant	Not targeted/Not screened	Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society	I.5. Government & Civil Society
GREEN CLIMATE FUND/WB TRUST FUNDS AND PARTNERSHIPS	2015002157	Total Mul. P1	gcf-b26-inf07.pdf (28th July, 2020)	BLANK	Imputed multilateral contributions	Imputed multilateral contributions	Multilateral Organisations	XII. Unallocated / Unspecified
IFAD 10 2016 – 2018	2015002030	Total Mul. P1	Results Framework – IFAD10.pdf (18th November, 2014) IFAD10-3-R.pdf (8th October, 2014)	BLANK	Imputed multilateral contributions	Imputed multilateral contributions	Multilateral Organisations	XII. Unallocated / Unspecified
MA-CLIMATE CHANGE RESILIENCE AND INCLUSION IN VIETNAM	2018001958	Viet Nam	QZA18_0159-227 _ 10835 Viet Climate Change Resilience Project Document 2018-2022.docx (1st June 2017)	2	Not targeted/Not screened	Significant	Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society	II.4. Banking & Financial Services
PROBLUE MULTI DONOR TRUST FUND	2018000943	Developing countries, unspecified	Problue.pdf (2018)	1	Significant	Significant	Multilateral Organisations	IV.1. General Environment Protection
REGIONAL CENTER FOR COMMUNITIES DEVELOPMENT – CERFOR	2017001436	Guatemala	Grant Agreement 1600868-11 Undertegnet avtale 1630930_1_1.pdf (2017) 1600868-20 Vedlegg 1. Resultatrammeverk 1885132_1_1.pdf (2017) 1600868-20 Vedlegg 2.Resultatrammeverk2017-2018 1885133_1_1.pdf (2017)	2	Significant	Significant	Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society	I.6. Other Social Infrastructure & Services
SUPPORT TO ICIMOD FOR THE PERIOD 2018-2022	2018002560	Asia, regional	ICIMOD Strategy and Results Framework 31 August 2017 Final.pdf (2017) Signed DD.pdf (2018)	1	Significant	Significant	University, college or other teaching institution, research institute or think-tank	IV.1. General Environment Protection

## Sweden

Project	CRS I.D	Recipient	Files	GEM	Adaptation marker	Mitigation marker	Channel of delivery	Sector
ENERGIA 2018-2021 – ENERGIA 2018-2022	2018061548A	Developing countries, unspecified	2018061548A – Programme Proposal ENERGIA Phase 6_Empowering Women Engendering Energy, clean.pdf (3rd December, 2018)	2	Not targeted/Not screened	Significant	Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society	II.3. Energy
FORUM SYD FRAME 2018-2022	2018063102R	Developing countries, unspecified	2018063102R – Ansökan Forum Syd 2018-2022.pdf (29th September, 2017)	1	Not targeted/Not screened	Significant	Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society	I.5. Government & Civil Society
PROBLUE - PROBLUE INKL PROFISH INKL FTTI	2018066780A	Developing countries, unspecified	018066780A – ANNEX C – GENDER.pdf (2018) 2018066780A – Concept Note FINAL World Bank ProBlue.pdf (17th March 2021) 2018066780A – ANNEX A – Results Matrices FINAL.pdf(2018)	1	Significant	Not targeted/Not screened	Multilateral Organisations	IV.1. General Environment Protection
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION VILANCULOS PHASE 2 – RURAL	2018064688A	Mozambique	Annex 3 Socio Economic and Gender Analysis Report Vilanculos Final Version.pdf (June, 2018) Annex 7 EDM Gender Policy.pdf (2018) Project Document Rural electrification of Vilanculos Area, Phase 2.pdf (July, 2013)	1	Significant	Significant	Public Sector Institutions	II.3. Energy
SCA CORE SUPPORT 2018-2021 – SCA 2018-2021	2018067810A	Afghanistan	2018067810A – SAK Ansökan kärnstöd 2018-2021 Bilaga 1 (Application).pdf (22nd May, 2017) sca_strategic_plan_2014-17_web.pdf (2017)	2	Significant	Not targeted/Not screened	Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society	I.6. Other Social Infrastructure & Services
UNDP ZIMBABWE RESILIENCE BUILDING FUND 2018 – 2021	2017061310A	Zimbabwe	2018061310A – Zimbabwe Resilience Building Fund Proposal.pdf (2017)	2	Principal	Principal	Multilateral Organisations	IV.2. Other Multisector
UNEP 2018—2022 – UNEP 2018--	2018061549A	Developing countries, unspecified	2018061549A – UNEP_MTS_2018-2021.pdf (2018)	1	Significant	Principal	Multilateral Organisations	IV.1. General Environment Protection

WETLANDS PROGRAM PHASE 2 MALI	2017061375A	Mali	2017061375A_Wetland project Mali_Evaluation Substudy1- Mali-webb.pdf (2020) 2017061375A_Wetland project Mali_gender strategy.pdf (2017)	2	Principal	Principal	Public Sector Institutions	III.1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing
UNDRR 2021-2025 - UNDRR	2021060222A	Developing countries, unspecified	UNDRR STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 2022 -2025	0	Principal	Not targeted/Not screened	Multilateral organisations	IV.2. Other Multisector